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ARTICLE
MAVERICKS, MERGERS, AND EXCLUSION:
PROVING COORDINATED COMPETITIVE
EFFECTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
Antitrust law has long been concerned that the loss of a firm, through merger or
exclusion, may improve the prospects for tacit or express collusion in a concen-
trated market. In merger law, this perspective has been codified as a presumption
of anticompetitive effect arising from high and increasing market concentration.
Antitrust's structural presumption has been eroding in the courts, however, in part
because its economic underpinnings increasingly are seen as unsettled. This Article
explains how coordinated competitive effects analysis can be reconstructed around
the role of a maverick firm that constrains prices when industry coordination is
incomplete. Doing so helps distinguish procompetitive mergers from anticompeti-
tive ones, and may aid in the analysis of alleged exclusion. It also provides a new
economic justification for the structural presumption and points toward a continu-
ing role for that presumption when the maverick cannot be identified or when it is
not possible to determine the effect of a merger on the maverick's incentives. The
resulting approach to coordinated competitive effects analysis is illustrated with an
extended example involving oligopoly conduct in the U.S. passenger airline
industry.
INTRODUCIMON
The proposed passenger airline merger between United and US
Airways, abandoned in mid-2001,1 would have reduced the number of
major U.S. airlines from seven to six.2 Following a traditional anti-
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1998, the author served as Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
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1 DOJ Opposes Airline Consolidation; United and US Airways Cancel Deal, 81 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. 96 (2001) (noting that merger agreement terminated shortly after
Justice Department opposition was announced on July 27, 2001).
2 See Trial Brief of the United States at 13 n.15, United States v. N.W. Airlines Corp.,
No. 98-74611 (E.D. Mich. filed Oct. 23,2000) ("Major airlines at most include United Air-
lines, Delta Airlines, American Airlines, Northwest, Continental, US Airways and
TWA."); see also Frank Swoboda & Don Phillips, United to Acquire US Airways, Wash.
Post, May 24,2000, at Al (measuring size by number of miles flown by paying passengers,
135
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trust analysis of the nationwide interaction among these carriers, a
court would be expected to conclude that, with fewer firms, tacit collu-
sion among the sellers to raise prices above competitive levels would
have become more likely had the merger proceeded. 3 But support for
the traditional analysis in both the case law and the economics litera-
ture has been eroding.4 Another way to analyze the possibility of tacit
collusion is to observe that another firm, Northwest, has acted in re-
cent years as the industry maverick-the firm that keeps the major
carriers' systemwide price increases lower than they otherwise would
have been.5 A merger analysis centered on the role of the maverick
would ask whether the transaction affects Northwest's incentives or
ability to constrain systemwide price increases.6 This Article argues
that such an analysis has a critical role to play in the evaluation of
both merger and exclusion cases, and explains when and why the mav-
six largest airlines were American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United and US Air-
ways). The merger also would have led the number of major carriers offering nonstop
service to decline from two to one on various city-pair routes, making the proposal a
merger to monopoly in those markets (at least with respect to business travelers, who may
have had no other practical alternatives). See Press Release, Department of Justice, De-
partment of Justice and Several States Will Sue to Stop United Airlines from Acquiring US
Airways (July 27, 2001) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (identifying
routes on which US Airways and United are one another's only nonstop competitors).
This Article ignores this aspect of the proposed transaction, notwithstanding its potential
significance in a regulatory review of the merger, in order to focus on the possibility of
coordinated competitive effects. For history of the failed United/US Airways merger, see
generally Keith L. Alexander, US Airways and United Extend Merger Deadline, Wash.
Post, Mar. 7, 2001, at El; Neil Irwin, Fate of Airlines' Merger Cloudy, Wash. Post, July 29,
2000, at E2.
3 A reduction in the number of sellers from seven to six likely leads to an increase in
concentration in excess of the safe harbor levels of the current Merger Guidelines, al-
though those levels are based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which takes into
account the size distribution of the sellers as well as the number of firms. See U.S. Dep't of
Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.5 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,104 [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines] ("Market concentration is a function
of the number of firms in a market and their respective market shares."). The efficiency
section of these Guidelines (§ 4) was revised in 1997; in all other respects the 1992 Guide-
lines are still in force. See Introduction, U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 91 13,100. Throughout this paragraph, the discussion assumes that the
airline industry environment is conducive to collusion, in the sense that entry would not
undermine higher than competitive prices and that the market structure would not pre-
clude the firms from reaching a consensus and detecting and responding to cheating on it.
See infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text. It also assumes that it is sensible to analyze
airline industry competition in terms of the nationwide interaction among hub-and-spoke
network carriers, each of which implements price changes in a common way over its entire
route system. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
4 See infra Part I.
5 The role of Northwest is considered more fully infra at notes 134-47 and accompany-
ing text. Strategies for identifying a maverick are discussed more fully infra at Part II.D.
6 See infra Part III.
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erick-centered approach should be preferred to the traditional
approach.
The antitrust laws long have been concerned that the loss of a
firm, through merger, foreclosure or exclusion,7 may facilitate coordi-
nated competitive effects (tacit or express collusion). The "ultimate
issue" in reviewing a merger under the antitrust laws, according to
Judge Richard Posner, is "whether the challenged acquisition is likely
to hurt consumers, as by making it easier for the firms in a market to
collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above or farther
above the competitive level." 9 Exclusionary conduct, too, may lead to
changes in market structure that help create or maintain a collusive
agreement.' 0
Yet antitrust jurisprudence and commentary have devoted sur-
prisingly little attention to understanding when and how the loss of a
firm will facilitate collusion. During antitrust's structural era, the de-
cades before the field's Chicago School revolution began in the mid-
1970s," analysis was unnecessary because the linkage seemed obvi-
7 Throughout this Article, the terms "exclusion" and "foreclosure" will be employed
broadly, to include raising rivals' costs or reducing rivals' access to the market. Complete
foreclosure is not necessary for exclusionary conduct to confer market power on the re-
maining firms. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclu-
sion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209, 214, 230-42
(1986) (focusing exclusion analysis on cost disadvantage of rivals).
8 The terms "collusion" and "coordination" are used interchangeably in this Article,
although they are technically distinct. Coordination is an economic term describing out-
comes resulting from the repeated interaction among the firms in a market. Collusion is an
older term employed in both the legal and economic literatures to describe interdependent
decisionmaking among the firms in a market. The term collusion sometimes carries with it
the legal idea of an agreement. In legal usage, collusion is "tacit" rather than "express" if
the firms informally reach a consensus without providing assurances that they will carry
out their promises. In practice, however, express collusion often is equated with the logi-
cally different concept of an agreement that can be demonstrated through direct rather
than circumstantial evidence. The distinction between tacit and express collusion, like the
distinction between proof by direct evidence and circumstantial evidence, matters in the
legal analysis of challenged practices but is less important to their economic analysis.
These and other related concepts are explored more fully in Jonathan B. Baker, Two
Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contem-
porary Economic Theory, 38 Antitrust Bull. 143, 145-46 n.7, 152-53 n.16, 156 n.22, 195-96
(1993).
9 Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (uphold-
ing FTC injunction against acquisition reducing number of hospitals competing in Chatta-
nooga market from eleven to seven, and number of major firms to four).
10 See infra Part IV.
11 Three broad eras of antitrust interpretation can be identified. During antitrust's
classical era, around the end of the nineteenth century, the Sherman Act was understood
"as a way to protect natural rights to economic liberty, security of property, and the pro-
cess of competitive, free exchange from artificial interference." Jonathan B. Baker, A
Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Analysis
(Roger van den Bergh et al. eds., forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 3-8, on file with the
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ous. The dominant and largely unquestioned view among economists
and antitrust commentators was that when only a few firms competed
in an industry, they readily would find a way to reduce rivalry, collude
tacitly, and raise prices above the competitive level.12 During that era,
mergers increasing concentration and exclusionary practices generat-
ing substantial foreclosure effectively were assumed to create market
power.
The question of how the loss of a firm would facilitate collusion
became important only later, as antitrust law engaged the Chicago
School criticisms of the structural approach. Economist George Stig-
ler identified the issue in 1964, explaining that the success of collusion,
whether tacit or express, could not be assumed; it requires that the
firms find a way both to reach a consensus on price and firm market
shares and to deter cheating on that consensus.13 As Stigler's ideas
percolated into antitrust law, the likelihood of collusion became a
matter of analysis rather than one of assumption.
Accordingly, courts and enforcement agencies reviewing mergers
have become sophisticated in analyzing whether the market has fea-
tures that will help the remaining firms overcome the impediments to
successful collusion. 14 Most of the attention, however, is on this issue;
commentators and courts have much less to say about the mechanism
by which the loss of a firm makes coordination more likely or more
effective. Indeed, in merger law, harm to competition from the loss of
a rival is presumed without analysis. The Philadelphia National
New York University Law Review). The structural era, around the middle of the twentieth
century, was based on the view that when only a few firms competed in an industry, those
sellers readily would find a way to mute their rivalry and exercise market power, thereby
harming buyers. Id. at 8-10. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Chicago
School took a purely economic approach to antitrust, relaxing or overturning many prior
antitrust prohibitions in order to facilitate efficiency-enhancing methods of lowering costs
or improving products. Id. at 11-24. For further discussion of the evolution of antitrust
interpretation since 1890, see William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Cen-
tury of Economic and Legal Thinking, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 2000, at 43.
12 See Baker, supra note 8, at 149.
13 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44, 44-46 (1964). Cartels
must also solve a third problem, deterring entry. Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff,
Modem Industrial Organization 126 (3d ed. 2000) (observing that firms only will join cartel
if it can keep prices high, and entry by nonmember firms prevents cartel from raising
price).
14 See Hosp. Corp. of Am., 807 F.2d at 1386-92 (discussing factors that gave Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) reason to believe that hospital acquisition would lessen competi-
tion substantially); New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 342-52, 363-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing characteristics of ready-to-eat cereal industry that made
Kraft's acquisition of Nabisco's cereal assets unlikely to produce anticompetitive coordi-
nated effects); 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, §§ 2.11, 2.12 (discussing market con-
ditions that are conducive to or hinder achievement and maintenance of coordination).
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Bank15 presumption, also termed the structural presumption, allows a
plaintiff challenging a merger to establish a prima facie case by dem-
onstrating that the acquisition increases market concentration sub-
stantially, raising it to a high level. 16
Moreover, when commentators and courts seek to justify the
structural presumption, their defense does not go far beyond the inev-
itability assumption of the structural era, at least for markets with en-
try barriers and other structural features that reduce the impediments
to successful collusion. According to Judge Posner, for example,
"[t]he fewer competitors there are in a market, the easier it is for them
to coordinate their pricing without committing detectable violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, which forbids price fixing.' 7 Similarly,
Judge Robert Bork explained that merger law "rests upon the theory
that, where rivals are few, firms will be able to coordinate their behav-
ior, either by overt collusion or implicit understanding, in order to
restrict output and achieve profits above competitive levels."' S Posner
and Bork are telling what will be referred to as the dinner party story:
Fewer firms make tacit collusion more likely or more effective for
much the same reason that friends arranging a restaurant get-together
likely will find it easier to coordinate the calendars of four people than
five, and more likely will notice if one person accepts but does not
show up. Under this view, coordination technically may not be inevi-
table when a market becomes highly concentrated, but the odds of
success are high and those odds improve as concentration increases.
Consequently, the dinner party story does not answer the question of
why the particular merger under review is likely to help the industry
solve its coordination problems. Rather, it is a probabilistic state-
ment-based on a rough empirical regularity, not an economic
model-that suggests competitive problems with every significant ac-
quisition in a concentrated market.
This probabilistic claim is widely accepted and deeply embedded
in antitrust thinking, but its underlying empirical support is not strong.
As will be discussed,19 the empirical economic literature does not
identify reliably any particular threshold level of concentration, com-
mon across industries, at which anticompetitive effects are likely to
kick in, and that literature makes clear that firm-specific and industry-
15 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
16 Id. at 363 (prohibiting merger of second- and third-largest banks in Philadelphia met-
ropolitan area on basis of structural presumption).
17 Hosp. Corp. of Am., 807 F.2d at 1387; see also FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d
901, 905 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).
18 FTC v. PPG Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.).
19 See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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specific factors, other than concentration, play an important role in
determining whether higher concentration will lead to higher prices.
To some observers, these limitations to the dinner party story call into
question whether to rely upon the structural presumption at all.
"Without more," observes one commentator, "we cannot state that
the merger itself will likely cause prices to rise."
'20
With the foundation for a key element of the structure of anti-
trust law appearing shaky, the doctrinal rules policing mergers could
begin to wobble. Both merging firms and government enforcers have
cause for concern. Without a strong economic justification, continued
reliance on the structural presumption creates a risk that procompeti-
tive mergers will be challenged or deterred. Even if the structural pre-
sumption is correct on average, the error costs associated with its
application may be substantial. Yet the alternative-jettisoning the
structural presumption-creates a risk that harmful mergers will es-
cape successful court challenge. The primary goal of this Article is to
shore up the shaky foundation of coordinated competitive effects
analysis by reconstructing the antitrust analysis of the loss of a firm,
whether through merger or exclusion, around the role played by a
maverick seller in constraining coordination. Doing so promises to
reduce the error costs of merger enforcement.
The concept of a maverick is not new to antitrust law; it appears
in the government's Merger Guidelines, where a maverick firm is de-
scribed as one with "a greater economic incentive to deviate from the
terms of coordination than do most of [its] rivals."'21 The Merger
Guidelines provide as an example a firm that has an "unusually dis-
ruptive and competitive" influence in the market,22 but the concept of
maverick also encompasses firms that constrain coordination from be-
coming more likely or more effective without necessarily starting price
wars or otherwise appearing observably disruptive.23 Although the
maverick concept appears in the Merger Guidelines, they can be read
to treat it as a special case, and mavericks are generally an after-
thought in contemporary antitrust practice.
This Article shows that the identification of a maverick that con-
strains more effective coordination is the key to explaining what the
dinner party story does not: which particular changes in market struc-
20 Timothy J. Muris, GTE Sylvania and the Empirical Foundations of Antitrust, 68 An-
titrust L.J. 899, 905 (2001). In June 2001, Muris became Chairman of the FTC. Muris
Takes Helm As New FTC Chairman, 80 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 507, 536 (2001).
21 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.12.
22 Id.
23 See infra Part II.C for a discussion of Northwest's role within the airline industry as
the latter type of maverick.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 77:135
MAVERICKS, MERGERS, AND EXCLUSION
ture from merger or exclusion are troublesome, and why. As will be
seen, the concept of a maverick is consistent with the contemporary
economic theory of oligopoly conduct,24 and explains the empirical
regularity of the dinner party story. A focus on identifying the indus-
try maverick can increase the precision of the antitrust analysis of
mergers and exclusion, allowing courts to understand better when the
loss of a firm is likely to promote tacit collusion and when it may not.
On average, mergers in concentrated markets protected from entry
increase the likelihood of coordination, and the focus on the role of a
maverick can help sort out whether any particular merger is likely to
do so.
Part I of the Article highlights the problem with the current ap-
proach in antitrust law in explaining why the loss of a firm improves
the prospects for collusion. It describes the erosion of the structural
presumption and identifies the empirical weakness behind the dinner
party story. Part II illustrates how the identification of a maverick can
help courts and enforcers reduce error costs, by refraining the eco-
nomic analysis of industry coordination around the role of the maver-
ick. This Part explains why coordination is a genuine concern in the
marketplace, notwithstanding the legal prohibition against price-fixing
and the economic difficulties firms face in reaching a consensus and
deterring cheating. It also explains why coordination is commonly im-
perfect and incomplete, how a maverick firm that constrains coordina-
tion emerges naturally in such a setting, and how the maverick may be
identified.25
Part III demonstrates the use of the concept of a maverick to
discriminate between procompetitive and anticompetitive mergers, in
part through hypothetical examples involving airlines. Several key
cases are analyzed: the loss of a maverick; the loss of a nonmaverick
with no incentive effects or with beneficial or harmful incentive effects
on the maverick; and the creation of a new maverick. In each scena-
rio, examining the maverick's role yields a more accurate picture of
whether and how the merger will harm consumers than does a simple
reliance on the structural presumption. Part IV then turns to a differ-
ent setting to demonstrate how identifying the role of the maverick
can aid in the antitrust analysis of alleged exclusion.
The Article concludes in Part V by seeking to rehabilitate the
structural presumption: The weak empirical regularity underlying the
24 An oligopoly is a market served by a small number of significant rivals.
25 For a related discussion working out the implications of the contemporary oligopoly
theory of coordination for another longstanding problem in antitrust, inferring an agree-
ment on price from parallel pricing and other circumstantial evidence, see Baker, supra
note 8, at 169-96.
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dinner party story is related to the probability, in the absence of spe-
cific evidence identifying a maverick, that the loss of a particular firm
would remove the industry maverick from the market. This explana-
tion suggests a continuing role for the structural presumption when
the maverick cannot be identified or when it is not possible to deter-
mine the effect of a merger on the maverick's incentives.
I
THE ERODING STRUCTURAL PRESUMPTION IN
MERGER ANALYSIS
26
A. Erosion in the Courts and Enforcement Agencies
Before the 1970s, the "oligopoly problem" loomed large in the
thinking of courts and commentators concerned with the review of
horizontal mergers under the antitrust laws.27 Coordination and
supracompetitive pricing commonly were thought to be nearly inevita-
ble when an industry had only a small number of firms.28 Economists
schooled in the "structure-conduct-performance" paradigm empha-
sized the way market structure (primarily concentration of sellers, but
also entry conditions, product differentiation, vertical integration, and
other factors) affected firm conduct (including pricing, advertising, in-
vestment, product variety, and research and development) and market
performance (including firm profits and economic welfare).29
26 Some of the discussion in this section was adapted from Jonathan B. Baker & Steven
C. Salop, Should Concentration Be Dropped from the Merger Guidelines?, in Am. Bar
Ass'n, Section of Antitrust Law, Perspectives on Fundamental Antitrust Theory 339
(2001).
27 Mere supracompetitive pricing (that is, pricing above the competitive level) by a
dominant firm or by firms in an oligopoly market is not illegal under the Sherman Act. A
dominant firm must engage in anticompetitive acts to obtain or maintain its market power
in order to violate section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994), and the oligopolistic
firms must reach an agreement that requires or facilitates higher than competitive prices in
order to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The possibility that the
firms in a market might exercise market power beyond the reach of the Sherman Act is
sometimes termed the "oligopoly problem." Baker, supra note 8, at 149. For further dis-
cussion of these and related issues, see id. at 149, 171-80.
28 See, e.g., Edward Hastings Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 7-8, 30-
55 (5th ed. 1946) ("[T]here must be a large number of buyers and sellers so that the influ-
ence of any one or of several in combination is negligible."); William Fellner, Competition
Among the Few 3-54 (1949) (analyzing how "fewness" of firms in industry changes eco-
nomic relations with results such as spontaneous coordination). This is not to say that
antitrust law violations were thought to be inevitable. Coordination might be reached
through price leadership or other methods that might not constitute a violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
29 See, e.g., Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition 1-2, 19-20, 180-81 (1956) (devel-
oping systematic theory on potential importance of condition of entry as influence on busi-
ness conduct and performance); Mark Allen Eisner, Antitrust and the Triumph of
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In this intellectual environment, antitrust scholars and practition-
ers accepted a strong presumption of economic harm from high mar-
ket concentration. 30 This view, combined with noneconomic
concerns, such as the protection of small business and the prevention
of adverse political consequences thought to arise from the aggrega-
tion of economic power, led Congress and the Supreme Court to look
to merger law as a vehicle for preventing increased market concentra-
tion in its incipiency.31 Oligopoly conduct might have to be tolerated
in industries that were already concentrated, 32 but it could be kept
from spreading to contaminate the rest of the economy through a
tough merger policy.33 These concerns were highlighted by the Su-
preme Court's extensive discussion of the legislative history of the
1950 amendments to the antimerger provisions of the Clayton Act in
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.34
Brown Shoe arguably set forth inconsistent themes. On the one
hand, the Court noted congressional recognition of "the stimulation to
competition that might flow from particular mergers," such as a
merger of two small firms that would allow those sellers "to compete
more effectively with larger corporations dominating the relevant
market .... -"35 When pursuing this theme, the Court emphasized con-
gressional concern with "the protection of competition, not competi-
tors . *.. "36 On the other hand, the Court acknowledged that
"Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. '37
Thus, the Court's focus on preventing a trend toward concentration in
an industry could also be understood as a mandate to protect competi-
tors-particularly small businesses-from being swallowed up in the
Economics 100-03 (1991) (describing views of adherents of "structure-conduct-perform-
ance" paradigm).
30 See, e.g., G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, Market Power: Size and Shape Under the
Sherman Act 122-23, 131-37 (1958) ("[T]he theory of monopolistic competition finds oli-
gopoly almost as objectionable as monopoly itself.").
31 See United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1963) (applying struc-
tural presumption based on market concentration); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962) (finding that Congress amended merger statute in 1950 in order to
arrest trends toward concentration in their incipiency).
32 See supra note 27.
33 See 6 Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law 1432d5, at 205 (1986) (describing "contain-
ment" approach of prohibiting concentrating mergers and practices facilitating collusion).
34 370 U.S. at 311-23. Brown Shoe prohibited a merger between the nation's third- and
eighth-largest shoe sellers. Neither firm made or sold more than four percent of the coun-
try's shoes, but the acquired firm was the largest shoe retailer handling brands produced by
shoe manufacturers not integrated into retailing. Id. at 297, 303.
35 Id. at 319.
36 Id. at 320.
37 Id. at 344.
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market for corporate control, even at the price of an efficiency loss to
the economy.
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,38 handed down one
year after Brown Shoe, highlighted the second theme in creating the
structural presumption that has since framed horizontal merger analy-
sis in the courts:
[The] intense congressional concern with the trend toward concen-
tration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of
market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive ef-
fects. Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and
results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially
that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing
that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects. 39
Two Supreme Court cases decided in 1966, three years after Phil-
adelphia National Bank, represent the high-water mark of judicial ef-
forts to halt industrial concentration. In both United States v. Von's
Grocery Co. 40 and United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,41 the Court
prohibited mergers among firms which, by present-day standards, had
small market shares in largely unconcentrated markets. In Von's, the
merging firms had market shares of 4.7% and 4.2% in the year before
the merger, and together accounted for 7.5% of the market during the
year after the merger.42 The largest firm in the market had only an
8% market share.43 In Pabst, the Court held that the structural pre-
sumption was triggered in three relevant markets, including one in
which the merging firms together held a market share of only 4.49%. 44
The message of these horizontal merger decisions was clear: The
structural presumption was virtually conclusive. Similarly, exclusive-
dealing cases in antitrust's structural era closely scrutinized the long-
term foreclosure of even a small fraction of the market, though the
38 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
39 Id. at 363.
40 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Von's prohibited the merger of two Los Angeles area grocery
chains in the market where the number of individually owned stores had decreased from
5365 to 3818 over the past decade, while the number and size of chains was increasing. Id.
at 273, 277-78.
41 384 U.S. 546 (1966). The decision barred Pabst, the nation's tenth-largest brewer,
from acquiring Blatz, the eighteenth-largest. Id. at 547.
42 384 U.S. at 281 (White, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 281.
44 384 U.S. at 551-52.
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presumption of harm to competition from such conduct was less con-
clusive than the corresponding presumption in merger cases. 45
United States v. General Dynamics Corp. ,46 a Supreme Court case
decided in 1974, was a transitional decision that, in retrospect, looks
more like a modem case than it likely did at the time. After years
of litigation under Clayton Act section 7,47 during which, as Justice
Stewart famously wrote in dissent in Von's, "the Government always
wins,"' 48 the Supreme Court decided a merger case in favor of allowing
the acquisition, with Justice Stewart writing the majority opinion.
Moreover, the holding in General Dynamics established a legal point
that was not clear after Von's and Pabst: that the presumption of an-
ticompetitive effect derived from concentration is, in fact, rebutta-
45 In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (Standard Stations), exclu-
sive supply contracts with 16% of independent service stations accounting for almost 7%
of retail gas sales were held unlawful. Id. at 295. (Other major gasoline refiners had simi-
lar contracts, however, collectively foreclosing independent stations from a much larger
fraction of the market. Id.) The Supreme Court's next major exclusive dealing decision,
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), appeared less concerned
with low levels of foreclosure. In holding that the long-term foreclosure of less than one
percent of the affected commerce was insubstantial, the Tampa Electric majority distin-
guished Standard Stations by emphasizing the "industry-wide practice of relying upon ex-
clusive supply contracts" in the latter case, id. at 334, and recognized, using language more
suggestive of reasonableness analysis than strong presumption, that it was necessary to
analyze "the probable immediate and future effects" of that foreclosure "on effective com-
petition" within the market. Id. at 329. But five years later, the Court arguably returned to
skepticism about even low levels of market foreclosure. In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316 (1966), the Court upheld an FTC decision, under FTC Act section 5, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1994), objecting to exclusive dealing contracts by a shoe manufacturer with 650 retail
stores, 384 U.S. at 319-20. These stores accounted for roughly 11% of the manufacturer's
retail customers, and the manufacturer itself accounted for no more than 6% of wholesale
shoe sales nationally. See Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45, 47, 49 (8th Cir. 1964),
rev'd, 384 U.S. 316 (1966) (providing sales figures).
As with the levels of concentration that raised concern in early horizontal merger
analysis, the market share thresholds suggested by Standard Stations and FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co. are stringent by contemporary standards. Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Jefferson Parish Hospital District v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), courts rarely have con-
demned exclusive dealing on market share foreclosure below 30%. See ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 223 & n.1242 (4th ed. 1997) (citing lower
court cases permitting exclusive dealing at market shares of up to 40% but not exceeding
50%). Moreover, again in parallel with developments in merger law, modem-day courts
consider a wide range of factors in determining the reasonableness of exclusive dealing
contracts. See Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that challenges to exclusive dealing should be analyzed under rule of reason); U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595, 597 (1st Cir. 1993) (requiring
"careful weighing of alleged dangers and potential benefits" under rule of reason but de-
clining to consider whether plaintiff must demonstrate likely impact on consumers).
46 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
47 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
48 384 U.S. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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ble.49 But the successful rebuttal in General Dynamics was on narrow
grounds. The market shares from which the government sought to
claim a presumption of harm to competition were measured in terms
of past production. The majority recognized that shares measured in
these units were unlikely to capture the future competitive signifi-
cance of market participants in the coal industry.50 The Court con-
cluded that the acquired coal producer's apparent market share vastly
overstated its future competitive significance because the company
had virtually no reserves and no reasonable prospect of obtaining any.
"[T]he finding of inadequate reserves went to the heart of the Gov-
ernment's statistical prima facie case based on production figures and
substantiated the District Court's conclusion that [the acquired firm],
even if it remained in the market, did not have sufficient reserves to
compete effectively for long-term contracts. '51
At the time General Dynamics was decided, the Court's ruling
could be interpreted as not questioning the continuing vitality of
Von's and Pabst: Had market concentration in General Dynamics
been measured correctly, in terms of coal reserves rather than past
coal production, the acquiring firm's market share would have in-
creased by less than one percent, a very small increase in concentra-
tion.52 The structural-era presumption that higher market
concentration invariably increased the likelihood of tacit collusion was
called into question only later, beginning in the mid-1970s, by devel-
opments in economics that began to affect legal doctrine during anti-
trust's Chicago School revolution.53 High prices were no longer seen
as the inevitable result of high market concentration; the success of
tacit collusion instead was understood to depend upon whether the
firms were able to overcome the difficulties of identifying a consensus
49 See Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 503-04 (upholding district court conclusion that
merger would not harm competition, notwithstanding merging firms' high shares of past
production).
50 Id. at 501-02.
51 Id. at 508.
52 Id. at 502.
53 The first Supreme Court decisions reflecting a Chicago-school perspective were not
decided until the late 1970s. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S.
1, 19-24 (1979) (holding agreement among rivals affecting price is not illegal per se if it
substantially lowers costs); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977)
(holding that vertical nonprice restraints are tested under rule of reason); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,488-89 (1977) (holding damages remedy unavail-
able to rival challenging merger under antitrust laws because its injury would not be of
type that claimed violations would be likely to cause). But the Chicago School influence
appeared as early as 1975 in appellate decisions taking supply substitution into account in
market definition. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Problem with Baker Hughes and
Syufy: On the Role of Entry in Merger Analysis, 65 Antitrust L.J. 353, 354-56 (1997)
(discussing appeals court decisions).
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on price and market shares and deterring cheating on that
consensus.5 4
When a Chicago-oriented legal scholar, William Baxter, was ap-
pointed by President Reagan to head the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, he confronted the problem of harmonizing the
existing horizontal merger precedent with the economic approach of
the Chicago School.55 The 1982 Merger Guidelines56 issued by Baxter
did so by declaring that concentration was highly influential but not
outcome-determinative in evaluating acquisitions among horizontal ri-
vals. On the one hand, the 1982 Merger Guidelines stated that the
analysis of a horizontal merger would "focus first" on the postmerger
market concentration and the market shares of the merging firms.5 7
In addition, they indicated that the Justice Department was "unlikely"
to challenge horizontal mergers where the postmerger market struc-
ture had the equivalent of at least ten equally sized firms, and "likely"
to challenge acquisitions of all but the smallest rivals if the postmerger
market had the equivalent of no more than approximately five or six
equally sized firms.58 On the other hand, the Guidelines noted that
the Department would also examine a variety of other factors59 rele-
54 See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
55 See William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 Cal.
L. Rev. 618, 618 (1983) (noting that Baxter aimed "to bring the Guidelines into line with
subsequent developments in antitrust law and economics"); cf. Thomas E. Kauper, The
1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure, 71 Cal. L. Rev.
497, 498-99 (1983) (claiming that 1982 Guidelines were timed appropriately to incorporate
new economic consensus that emerged in years immediately prior to their issuance).
56 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1982), reprinted in 42 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. 1069, § III, at S6 (Supp. 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines]. The 1982
Guidelines replaced those that had been promulgated in 1968, before General Dynamics.
A similar approach to harmonizing structural antitrust doctrine with Chicago School eco-
nomic thinking had previously been suggested for the measurement of single-firm market
power in an influential article by Landes and Posner. William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937, 947 (1981).
57 See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 56, § III, at S6.
58 Id. § III.A.1, at S6. Both the 1982 and 1992 Merger Guidelines use the HHI as a
measure of industry concentration in evaluating horizontal mergers. Id.; 1992 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 3, § 1.5. The index is calculated by summing the squares of individ-
ual market shares of all the participants. Under the 1982 Guidelines, an agency challenge
was "unlikely" if the postmerger HHI was below 1000, between 1000 and 1800 and not
rising by more than 100 points as a result of the merger, or above 1800 and not rising by
more than 50 points. An agency challenge was "more likely than not" if the postmerger
HHI was between 1000 and 1800 and the HHI increased by more than 100 points, and
"likely" if the postmerger HHI exceeded 1800 and rose by 100 points or more. 1982
Merger Guidelines, supra note 56, § III.A.1, at S6.
59 These included a list of factors that "will create, enhance, or facilitate the exercise of
market power." 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 56, § III.C, and this discussion has
been amplified in later Guidelines revisions. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3,
§§ 2.1, 2.11, 2.12 (discussing factors relevant to analyzing lessening of competition through
coordinated interaction).
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vant to whether the transaction posed a significant threat to competi-
tion, even when concentration was high.
To be sure, as the 1992 Merger Guidelines make clear, coordina-
tion is no longer the sole concern of merger analysis.60 The federal
enforcement agencies, in particular, now recognize that mergers may
harm competition without increasing the likelihood of coordination by
making it profitable for the merging firms to raise prices unilaterally.
61
But the rise of unilateral competitive effects analysis has comple-
mented the traditional concern about coordination without replacing
it in the deliberations of the courts and agencies.
62
The same problem Baxter confronted-harmonizing the older
structural-era decisions with contemporary economic thinking-re-
mains central to horizontal merger analysis today. Although the Su-
preme Court has not revisited its approach to the question since the
time of General Dynamics,63 several appeals courts have done so. The
D.C. Circuit opinion in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.64 may be
the most influential, as it was written by one future Supreme Court
Justice (Clarence Thomas) and joined in by another (Ruth Bader
Ginsburg) from the opposite wing of many present-day Court divi-
60 See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.2 (noting that, even in absence of
coordination, "[u]nilateral competitive effects can arise").
61 Id.; Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis,
Antitrust, Spring 1997, at 21.
62 See, e.g., New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 363-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (rejecting challenge to merger alleging both coordinated and unilateral competitive
effects theories); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 32-37, FTC v. Swedish Match, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 1:00CV1196-
R) (alleging both coordinated and unilateral effects from challenged transaction); Plain-
tiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 16-20, FTC v. Kroger Co., No. 3-00CV1196-R (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2000) (same).
63 The Court issued substantive antitrust merger decisions in three bank cases shortly
after General Dynamics, in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602
(1974), United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974), and United States
v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975). General Dynamics is, neverthe-
less, generally treated as the last major Supreme Court interpretation of Clayton Act sec-
tion 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Neither Marine Bancorporation nor Connecticut National
Bank was concerned with the scope of the structural presumption in horizontal merger
analysis: Marine Bancorporation addressed potential competition doctrine, a basis for
challenging conglomerate mergers, 418 U.S. at 623-41, and Connecticut National Bank was
a fact-intensive analysis of the district court's market definition in a potential competition
setting, 418 U.S. at 659-60. Although Citizens & Southern was a horizontal merger case, its
brief discussion of Clayton Act doctrine follows General Dynamics. Citizens & Southern,
422 U.S. at 120-22.
64 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Elsewhere, I have criticized a different aspect of
Baker Hughes, its analysis of when entry can rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case based on
market concentration. Baker, supra note 53, at 365-68.
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sions. Baker Hughes itself relies upon a Seventh Circuit opinion writ-
ten by Judge Richard Posner, a highly regarded antitrust scholar.65
Baker Hughes treats General Dynamics as the start of a new era
in merger analysis: General Dynamics "differ[ed] markedly in empha-
sis" from cases like Philadelphia National Bank, Pabst, and Von's be-
cause the Supreme Court no longer "accept[ed] a firm's market share
as virtually conclusive proof of its market power," but instead "care-
fully analyzed defendants' rebuttal evidence. '66 General Dynamics is
read as doing more than merely permitting rebuttal "by discrediting
the data underlying the initial presumption in the government's
favor;" it also is said to permit rebuttal "by affirmatively showing why
a given transaction is unlikely to substantially lessen competition. ' '67
The broader interpretation of General Dynamics by this and other
lower courts opened the door to a full range of rebuttal evidence.6S
Baker Hughes emphasizes that the presumption of harm to com-
petition that arises from a showing of high and increasing market con-
centration has eroded substantially since the days of Philadelphia
National Bank. The structural presumption no longer is seen as virtu-
ally conclusive. Rather, according to Baker Hughes, "[t]he Supreme
Court has adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach" to Clay-
ton Act section 7, under which "[e]vidence of market concentration
65 The Baker Hughes decision quoted this passage from Judge Posner:
The most important developments that cast doubt on the continued vitality of
such cases as Brown Shoe and Von's are found in other cases, where the Su-
preme Court, echoed by the lower courts, has said repeatedly that the eco-
nomic concept of competition, rather than any desire to preserve rivals as such,
is the lodestar that shall guide the contemporary application of the antitrust
laws, not excluding the Clayton Act.... Applied to cases brought under Sec-
tion 7, this principle requires the district court... to make a judgment whether
the challenged acquisition is likely to hurt consumers, as by making it easier for
the firms in the market to collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price
above or farther above the competitive level.
908 F.2d at 990 n.12 (quoting Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir.
1986) (Posner, J.)).
66 Id. at 990.
67 Id. at 991. The Baker Hughes court found in favor of the merging firms after consid-
ering rebuttal evidence involving ease of entry, volatile and shifting market shares, and the
sophistication of buyers. See id. at 986.
68 See id. at 986; United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 981-83 (2d Cir. 1984)
(concluding that ease of entry may rebut showing of prima facie illegality under Philadel-
phia National Bank). Moreover, in FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th
Cir. 1991), the court concluded that "in certain circumstances, a defendant may rebut the
government's prima facie case with evidence showing that the intended merger would cre-
ate significant efficiencies in the relevant market." Id. at 1222; accord FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizing efficiency defense in principle).
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simply provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into
future competitiveness.
''69
The most recent appellate decision on the antitrust analysis of
mergers, issued by the D.C. Circuit in Federal Trade Commission v.
H.J. Heinz Co.,7° highlights the continued role of concentration in
horizontal merger analysis. The decision nevertheless confirms that
the structural presumption is rebuttable and accepts the continued au-
thority of Baker Hughes and its analytic framework.
Consistent with Baker Hughes, the Heinz panel expressly re-
jected the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) contention that high
concentration in a market with entry barriers alone entitles the gov-
ernment to a preliminary injunction,71 and held that a successful re-
buttal requires evidence showing that market share statistics provide
"'an inaccurate account of the [merger's] probable effects on competi-
tion."72 Yet Heinz also decisively rejected the view that concentra-
tion is irrelevant once the merging firms proffer evidence to rebut the
government's prima facie case, at least in a merger-to-duopoly setting
congenial to reliance on an inference of anticompetitive effect from
market concentration. According to the court, a rebuttal premised on
the presence of "structural barriers to collusion" in a merger to duop-
oly requires identification of barriers unique to the industry under re-
view and proof that tacit collusion is more difficult to achieve or
maintain than in other industries. 73 Although the concentration levels
in Heinz were quite high, they were not much higher than those found
in Baker Hughes, where the government's prima facie case was suc-
cessfully rebutted.74
The more substantial weight accorded concentration in Heinz rel-
ative to Baker Hughes appears to derive from a special factor, the
court's skepticism about the particular efficiency defense proffered by
the merging firms,75 and thus should not be interpreted as a rejection
69 908 F.2d at 984.
70 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This case is discussed further infra at notes 197-219
and accompanying text.
71 246 F.3d at 716 n.11.
72 Id. at 715 (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120
(1975)). Heinz also recognized the possibility that, on other facts, an efficiencies defense-
one asserting that the proposed merger would result in a more efficient firm to the benefit
of consumers-could prevail. Id. at 720-22.
73 See id. at 724-25.
74 The Heinz transaction was characterized by the appeals court as a merger to duop-
oly, after which the HHI would have increased by 510 points to 5285. Id. at 716. Baker
Hughes involved an increase in the HHI of 1425 points to 4303. 908 F.2d at 983 n.3.
75 The merging firms argued that the efficiencies made tacit collusion unlikely, as they
would give the merged firm an incentive to expand its market share at the industry leader's
expense. See Heinz, 246 F.3d at 724. Efficiencies also were analyzed as an independent
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of Baker Hughes or a reversion to a 1960s interpretation of the struc-
tural presumption. When Baker Hughes was decided, proof of ease of
entry, the main defense in that case, was a well-established route to
rebutting the prima facie case based on concentration. 76 In contrast,
the merging firms in Heinz raised a less conventional rebuttal, relying
primarily on evidence of efficiencies to explain why the merger would
not harm competition.77 Once the appeals court concluded that the
district court's acceptance of that defense was unwarranted, it was left
with the unrebutted inference of harm to competition arising from the
reduction in the number of sellers. The focus on concentration in
Heinz thus appears more related to the ongoing development of the
doctrinal standards related to the efficiency defense than to any re-
thinking of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to merger anal-
ysis set forth in Baker Hughes.
Merger analysis at the federal antitrust enforcement agencies
under the current Merger Guidelines is similar to the modern ap-
proach of the courts. So long as the merger exceeds safe-harbor con-
centration levels, market concentration is incorporated along with all
other relevant factors into a broad economic analysis of the likely
competitive effects of the transaction.78 Although higher market con-
centration has been associated with a greater likelihood of agency
challenge (at least if entry likely would not solve the competitive
problem), the Merger Guidelines allow for the possibility that a
merger may not harm competition, even an acquisition in a highly
concentrated market.79
means of rebutting the government's prima facie case. See id. at 720-22. To the extent
Heinz raises the bar to defendants making an efficiency defense when concentration is
high, its practical effect may be to delegate efficiency analysis in such cases to the unre-
viewable prosecutorial discretion of the antitrust enforcement agencies.
76 See, e.g., United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1984)
(establishing that ease of entry may rebut prima facie showing of illegality under Philadel-
phia National Bank).
77 In reversing the district court and granting a preliminary injunction barring the
merger pending appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals noted: "This is a novel defense, which
the Supreme Court has not addressed since the 1960s (and then, unfavorably) ... and as to
which the antitrust enforcement agencies have only recently clarified their views." FTC v.
HJ. Heinz, No. 00-5362, 2000 WL 1741320, at *2 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 8, 2000).
7S See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 1.51. If the postmerger concentration
levels and the increase in concentration from merger both do not exceed certain minimum
thresholds, the agency is unlikely to investigate the transaction. These safe harbors include
postmerger HHI below 1000, postmerger HHI between 1000 and 1800 with an increase in
the HHI of less than 100 points, and postmerger HHI above 1800 with an increase in the
HHI of less than 50 points. See id.
79 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4 (revised 1997); ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Mergers and Acquisitions: Understanding the Antitrust Issues 92-95 (Robert S.
Schlossberg & Clifford H. Aronson eds., 2000).
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B. Economic Underpinnings of the Structural Presumption
With the general acceptance of economist George Stigler's identi-
fication of cartel problems,80 antitrust commentators lost faith in the
inevitability of a connection between high market concentration and
high price. Still, a wide range of economic theories of oligopoly con-
duct is consistent with the view that fewer firms and more concen-
trated markets, on average, are associated with higher prices.81 In
general, the smaller the number of firms, the more likely they will be
able to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome at a higher-than-com-
petitive price, and, as will be emphasized below,82 the less likely that
one firm will act as a maverick to limit or undermine that possibility.
Accordingly, a horizontal merger reducing the number of rivals from
four significant firms to three would be more likely to raise competi-
tive concerns than one reducing the number from ten to nine, all else
equal.83
Notwithstanding the development of these theories, the loss of
faith in the inevitability of a tacit collusion in concentrated markets
made the existence and strength of the structural presumption an em-
pirical question. The original attempts of economists to find such a
relationship by relating market concentration to firm profits were sub-
80 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing difficulties of coordination).
81 Not all of the theories involve coordinated competitive effects. Other economic
models suggesting that mergers may lead to higher prices presume a static (nonrepeated)
oligopoly interaction, generating unilateral competitive effects. See generally Raymond
Deneckere & Carl Davidson, Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition, 16
Rand J. Econ. 473 (1985) (analyzing horizontal mergers in price-setting and quantity-set-
ting games with product differentiation); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Merg-
ers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 107 (1990) (analyzing horizontal
mergers in Cournot oligopoly model). These and other unilateral competitive effects pos-
sibilities provide a theoretical basis for the structural presumption independent of the coor-
dinated competitive effects possibilities highlighted in this Article, but they do not provide
a justification for relying upon the dinner party story to explain why coordinated competi-
tive effects are likely to occur.
82 See infra notes 285-92 and accompanying text.
83 An economic basis for this empirical regularity when industry conduct is coordinated
is set forth infra at Part V. The significance of increases in market concentration from any
particular merger for how a court should rule depends upon the competitive effects theory
advanced in that case. Concentration matters least in predicting the consequences of an
acquisition when the competitive concern involves the loss of localized competition among
sellers of differentiated products-a "unilateral" competitive-effects theory different from
those referenced in the previous note, which has come to play a major role in merger
analysis at the federal enforcement agencies during the past decade. See 1992 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.21 (describing unilateral effects among sellers of differenti-
ated products); Baker, supra note 61, at 23 (describing localized competition theory of
competitive effects). In this situation, market shares and concentration matter primarily to
the extent that market shares are related to diversion ratios or demand cross-elasticities.
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ject to devastating criticism.84 Empirical economists, led by Leonard
Weiss, sought to address these problems by relating market concentra-
tion to price with some success, particularly in analyses of different
markets within the same industry. ,5 Although these studies, too, have
been questioned,8 6 they appear to find a relationship between market
concentration and industry price. Richard Schmalensee properly con-
cluded in 1989 that "[i]n cross-section comparisons involving markets
in the same industry, seller concentration is positively related to the
level of price."8 7 More recent studies, using empirical methodologies
and data unavailable to Weiss, have reinforced Schmalensee's conclu-
sion and have made clear that increases in concentration, particularly
substantial ones, may generate large increases in prices.88
84 The most important problem with empirical studies of the relationship between con-
centration and profits was emphasized by economist Harold Demsetz: If firms with high
market shares have high price-cost margins (and thus high profits), is it because the large
firms are able to exercise market power or because the large firms have obtained efficien-
cies that allow them to lower both costs and prices relative to their rivals? See Harold
Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in Industrial Concentration: The New
Learning 164, 176-81 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974). A modem review of the
results of these studies finds: "The relation, if any, between seller concentration and profit-
ability is weak statistically, and the estimated concentration effect is usually small. The
estimated relation is unstable over time and space and vanishes in many multivariate stud-
ies." Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2
Handbook of Industrial Organization 951, 976 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig
eds., 1989) [hereinafter Handbook of Industrial Organization] (Stylized Fact 4.5).
85 See Leonard W. Weiss, Conclusion, in Concentration and Price 268 (Leonard W.
Weiss ed., 1989) (concluding that majority of economic studies find significant positive re-
lationship between concentration and price); see generally Gregory J. Werden, A Review
of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence on the Relationship Between Market Struc-
ture and Performance (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Econ. Analysis Group Discussion Paper 91-3,
May 8, 1991) (providing survey of price-concentration studies).
86 The critics emphasize two problems. First, the studies may not always specify the
model appropriately. This problem would create measurement error-the concentration
variable would be measured poorly-and would be expected to lead the statistical analyses
to understate any relationship between price and concentration that does exist. (Note that
this criticism bolsters, rather than undermines, the structural presumption). Second, the
studies may not account adequately for the reverse effect of price on concentration. For
discussion of these and other criticisms, see Tmothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of
Industries with Market Power, in Handbook of Industrial Organization, supra note 84, at
1011, 1042-44; Carlton & Perloff, supra note 13, at 257-59; William M. Evans et al., En-
dogeneity in the Concentration-Price Relationship: Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 41
J. Indus. Econ. 431, 431-34 (1993).
87 Schmalensee, supra note 84, at 988 (Stylized Fact 5.1).
88 For example, the results reported in Timothy F. Bresnahan & Valerie Y. Suslow,
Oligopoly Pricing with Capacity Constraints, 15/16 Annales D'Economie et de Statistique
267 (1989), suggest that a merger in the North American aluminum industry during the
1960s and 1970s would have led to a price increase of 2.7% during cyclical downturns,
when the firms were operating at excess capacity, for every one-hundred point increase in
the HHI of market concentration. See id. at 278, 282, 284 (reporting empirical data used
by present author for this computation). Similarly, the FTC's econometric evidence
showed that the proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot-which would have
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But the empirical economic evidence does not support the older
view that high market concentration makes tacit collusion inevitable.
While market concentration appears related to price, and improved
prospects for tacit collusion offer one possible explanation, concentra-
tion is far from the only factor relevant to the assessment of whether
the disappearance of a firm, through merger or exclusion, will facili-
tate coordination. Other industry-specific and market-specific factors
beyond concentration also are important in determining price and the
competitive effects of mergers.8 9 Moreover, the empirical research
does not reliably identify any particular level of concentration, com-
mon across industries, at which price increases kick in or raise particu-
lar competitive concerns. That is, there is no well-established
"critical" concentration ratio.
Accordingly, the contemporary economic learning on the rela-
tionship between market concentration and price suggests employing
concentration in much the way that the Merger Guidelines do so to-
day: as an important factor in competitive effects analysis, appropri-
ately considered in conjunction with other factors suggested by the
competitive effects theory, but far from the only factor relevant to
understanding firm conduct and market performance. 90 Economists
have learned much about the other factors that may make an industry
environment more or less conducive to coordination. 91 The legal
analysis of coordinated competitive effects of mergers has followed by
reduced the number of firms from three to two in some markets and from two to one in
others-would have raised price by about eight percent on average. Jonathan B. Baker,
Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18 J. Pub. Pol'y & Marketing 11, 13-17 (1999).
These studies make careful efforts to account for differences in the competitive roles
played by various firms, and to distinguish between high costs and market power as the
explanation for high prices.
89 These factors may include the determinants of firm cost and demand other than mar-
ket concentration, such as input prices, the extent of scale and scope economies, and the
price of demand substitutes, as well as determinants of oligopoly conduct other than mar-
ket concentration, such as factors facilitating or frustrating coordination.
90 The theoretical possibility that concentrated markets could perform competitively,
combined with the limitations to the empirical studies identifying a relationship between
concentration and price, have led some to question whether any presumption should be
applied. Ky P. Ewing Jr., The Soft Underbelly of Antitrust: Some Challenging Thoughts
for the New Millennium, Antitrust Rep., Sept. 1999, at 2, 2-4; Barry C. Harris & David D.
Smith, The Merger Guidelines vs. Economics: A Survey of Economic Studies, Antitrust
Rep., Sept. 1999, at 23, 24-25. This proposal goes too far, as the concluding Part of this
Article explains. Moreover, if concentration poorly predicts harm to competition, there is
no basis for giving a free pass to mergers in unconcentrated markets or to acquisitions of
small rivals, as is done commonly today.
91 For a recent survey of an extensive economic literature, see Simon J. Evenett &
Valerie Y. Suslow, Preconditions for Private Restraints on Market Access and Interna-
tional Cartels, 3 J. Int'l Econ. L. 593 (2000).
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emphasizing an investigation of whether the industry structure is con-
ducive to solving cartel problems.92
The economic literature leaves the antitrust analysis of coordi-
nated competitive effects in a troubled state. Even in a market in
which it appears feasible for sellers to solve the cartel problems of
reaching a consensus and deterring cheating, that observation about
the industry environment does not go far in explaining why the loss of
a particular firm, through merger or exclusion, makes coordination
more likely or more effective. The dinner party story-a probabilistic
prediction with some but not overwhelming empirical grounding-fills
the gap, but without providing a deep understanding of why any par-
ticular merger likely would or would not improve the prospects for
coordination.
In order to understand the latter problem properly, two types of
uncertainty must be distinguished: the uncertainty involved in know-
ing whether a particular economic model applies in an empirical set-
ting, and the uncertainty involved in relying on an empirical regularity
without a model. An analogy may clarify the distinction. Until some
time during the twentieth century, perhaps the best predictor of the
weather tomorrow in a given location was the weather today. One
might imagine weather forecasters calling this a presumption, based
on an empirical regularity. With more data and computers, it might
be possible to improve on the simple empirical prediction. One could
imagine correlating weather in various cities with the previous day's
weather, not just in that city, but in other cities at varying distances,
controlling for predictable seasonal variation, and coming up with a
complex regression equation for predicting the weather based on em-
pirical regularities. 93
This approach only can go so far in helping meteorologists make
weather forecasts because, while it relies on some empirical regularity,
it does not do much to help them understand why the weather
changes in order to improve their predictive capability. To do better
at forecasting the weather, meteorologists have developed scientific
models of weather system formation and movement. They have de-
veloped concepts like air masses, fronts, and the jet stream, and have
used those concepts to structure models of the atmosphere. Those
92 See, e.g., Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FrC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
(upholding FTC determination that merger of hospital chains is likely to harm competition
in Chattanooga by facilitating coordination).
93 In a similar spirit, one commentator has proposed relying on an empirical relation-
ship between increased market concentration and higher prices as a basis for merger analy-
sis if that relationship is specific to the industry under review. Muris, supra note 20, at 904-
06.
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models have helped to shape the collection of data, and observed pre-
diction errors help meteorologists come to a deeper understanding of
the way weather works, leading to model improvements and even bet-
ter predictions. 94 While weather forecasting is by no means perfect
today, meteorologists using models can do something astounding from
the perspective of weather forecasting a half-century ago: They can
predict when a storm not presently in existence will develop, forecast
its likely path, and locate the areas of greatest risk for heavy winds
and precipitation. 95
The analogy suggests the difficulty with basing antitrust doctrine
and enforcement policy upon the dinner party story.96 When it comes
to understanding coordination, antitrust law can do better in discrimi-
nating between anticompetitive and procompetitive changes in market
structure by going beyond the empirical regularity of the structural
presumption to incorporate insights from contemporary economic
theory. The following Part turns to the development of this Article's
central thesis: that the identification of a maverick who constrains
more effective coordination is the key to explaining what the dinner
party story does not, namely, which particular changes in market
structure from merger or exclusion are troublesome, and why.
II
THE ROLE OF MAVERICKS IN
OLIGOPOLISTIC COORDINATION
The concept of a maverick is not new to antitrust. As noted
above, it appears in the government's Merger Guidelines, where a
maverick firm is described as one with "a greater economic incentive
to deviate from the terms of coordination than do most of [its] ri-
vals.' '97 However, the Merger Guidelines can be read to suggest that
94 Mark Monmonier, Air Apparent: How Meteorologists Learned to Map, Predict,
and Dramatize Weather 97 (1999).
95 See, e.g., Michael William Carr, Weather Predicting Simplified 22-23 (1999) (describ-
ing prediction of explosive cyclones or rapidly intensifying lows).
96 The analogy is not perfect. The dinner party story is consistent with numerous eco-
nomic models, though many of these are not models of coordinated behavior. See supra
note 81 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that the absence of theory is not the
usual problem in empirical economics. More commonly, economists are unable to distin-
guish among a number of theories, each of which may be consistent with empirical regular-
ities, or else have so much data as to make it difficult to accept empirically any specific
theory. See Clive W.J. Granger, Empirical Modeling in Economics: Specification and
Evaluation 30-31, 41 (1999) (discussing problems of large data set and absence of unique
explanations).
97 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.12.
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the presence of a maverick is a special case,98 and, consistent with this
perspective, mavericks are generally an afterthought in contemporary
antitrust practice. Courts and agencies focus on the dinner party story
and rarely appeal to the maverick idea to explain the likely competi-
tive effects of a merger.99 This Part explains why the idea of a maver-
ick instead should play a central role in the analysis of coordinated
competitive effects.
A. Competition vs. Coordination
One way to understand coordination is to begin by asking why
the firms in a market ever compete. After all, however profitable
competition is for sellers, they each can expect to do better if all agree
to work together, for example, to maximize and split the joint profits
from acting as though they were a single firm.
It is tempting to point to the antitrust laws in response, and argue
that firms compete because, legally, they are required to do so. The
antitrust laws undoubtedly do encourage competition, as by proscrib-
ing many forms of conduct that would facilitate coordination. But this
answer is neither legally nor empirically satisfactory. As a legal mat-
ter, the antitrust laws promote competition but they do not mandate
it. A firm able to charge a monopoly price for its product, for exam-
ple, is permitted to do so; the Sherman Act's bar against monopoliza-
tion objects to acts to obtain or maintain monopoly power, not its
exercise. Rivals are not permitted to agree on price, but if, through
price leadership or otherwise, they reach a supracompetitive price
without engaging in conduct that can be enjoined as an agreement,
they are not prohibited from doing so.100 Empirically, moreover, the
antitrust laws are not a necessary precondition to competition. Before
the enactment of the Sherman Act, firms in a market did not necessa-
rily succeed in acting collectively as if they were a monopolist, even
when they were few in number.101
98 Id. ("In some circumstances, coordinated interaction can be effectively prevented or
limited by maverick firms ...." (emphasis added)).
99 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. But see Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motions for Preliminary Injunctions at 24, FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F.
Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998) (No. CIV. A.98-595) (describing one of four merging firms as
"the maverick"). Professor Michael Jacobs reports that during 1998-1999, the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission prohibited several proposed mergers on the
ground that the target firm was "a useful-indeed an indispensable-maverick." Michael
S. Jacobs, Second Order Oligopoly Problems with International Dimensions: Sequential
Mergers, Maverick Firms, and Buyer Power, 46 Antitrust Bull. 537, 548-49 (2001).
100 See Baker, supra note 8, at 173-74 (discussing problems with deeming agreement
"conscious parallelism").
101 For example, the empirical economic literature on the Joint Executive Committee,
an 1880s U.S. railroad cartel, highlights the inability of the firms to deter price wars. See
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 2002]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The main reason firms compete is economic, not legal: Firms are
led to compete rather than collude by their motive to maximize prof-
its. By lowering price, 0 2 a firm can increase the quantity it sells. If
the additional profit from selling more exceeds the lost profit from
cutting price, a firm will find that lowering price raises its profits. This
motive to compete may be particularly powerful if sellers have been
charging a price in excess of the competitive level. 0 3 When price ex-
ceeds the competitive price, a firm that slightly undercuts its rivals'
price often can expect to earn a high margin of price over cost on the
additional sales it makes by lowering price. If the firm can increase its
own sales a great deal through a small price reduction, its lost profits
(from lowering price on the quantity it would otherwise have been
able to sell) likely will be small relative to this gain. 04
In order for the firms in a market to coordinate successfully to
achieve and maintain a higher-than-competitive price in the face of
individual seller incentives to compete by lowering price, the firms
must find a way to make the higher price more attractive to each than
price cutting. To do so, they must find a way to solve what economists
term "cartel problems.' u0 5 First, they must reach consensus and iden-
tify the cartel outcome they will seek to achieve. They must select a
supracompetitive market price and allocate output (market shares)
among the sellers. Second, the firms must discourage cheating by de-
Glenn Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee, 25 RAND
J. Econ. 37, 37-38 (1994) (noting that "cartel was only partially successful" in setting prices
and suffered "occasional price wars"); Robert H. Porter, A Study of Cartel Stability: The
Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886, 14 Bell J. Econ. 301, 312-13 (1983) (noting "rever-
sions to noncooperative behavior...with a significant decrease in market price in these
periods").
102 The analysis would not change if competition also or instead occurs on other dimen-
sions such as improved product quality or new product features.
103 This is likely in a number of industries, including airlines. See infra notes 112, 149-55
and accompanying text.
104 When the firms in an industry are charging a price in excess of the competitive price,
the benefit of price cutting accruing to an individual firm may derive mainly from profits
shifted from its rivals. If so, the total profits earned by the sellers may collectively shrink
as the market price falls, yet profits may increase for the firm that lowers price. Competi-
tion can thus be understood as a product of what game theorists term a "prisoners' di-
lemma." If all firms could refrain from competing aggressively, all would benefit, but each
firm has an individual incentive to reduce price when the market price exceeds the compet-
itive level. These individual incentives to cut price lead to an outcome in which all firms
charge the competitive price, and no firm ends up doing as well as it would if all charged a
higher price.
105 This discussion assumes that industry participants compete in a well-defined market
protected from new competition. Thus, no attention will be paid to the problems of solving
a third "cartel problem" of discouraging entry. For analytical convenience, the problems of
reaching a consensus and deterring cheating are treated as separate steps, though the two
are interrelated. For example, a firm's preference as to the coordinated outcome will de-
pend upon how likely it is to be punished for cheating.
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terring every one of their number from expanding output and cutting
price.
Firms compete when they cannot solve these problems; collusion
is not inevitable even in a market with only a handful of rival sell-
ers.106 Firms may disagree on how far to raise the cartel price, and
even if they agree on that, they may be unable to agree on market
shares because each would profit from having a larger share of the
cartel output. They also may be unable to deter cheating, perhaps
because they cannot detect and punish such behavior before the price
cutter has made substantial sales and profits, or perhaps because they
cannot punish the price cutter with sufficient severity to make cheat-
ing unprofitable.
Moreover, the antitrust laws prohibit some of the most obvious
tactics firms might employ to solve their cartel problems. Firms can-
not agree to act together as though they were a monopolist. That
would involve an agreement to reduce output collectively from the
competitive output to the monopoly output, allowing producers with
high marginal costs to bear the brunt of the reduction in sales, and
allocating the resulting profits among the firms (with profit shares not
necessarily equal to production shares). Yet firms cannot negotiate
and sign a binding agreement setting forth the prices they charge and
the output each will sell; a naked price-fixing agreement would violate
the Sherman Act and potentially subject the firms to criminal penal-
ties.'0 7 For similar reasons, firms cannot make what economists term
"side payments" to rivals to induce them to shut down or reduce out-
put;108 and they cannot make enforceable commitments to respond to
a rival's price cutting by increasing output and reducing price, thus
punishing the cheater.10 9
In the wake of Stigler, some influential Chicago-oriented com-
mentators were persuaded that these cartel problems are nearly insur-
mountable. Under this view, tacit collusion is far from inevitable in a
oligopoly; it is virtually impossible. For example, Judge Bork wrote:
106 See Stigler, supra note 13, at 44, 50-51 (noting that oligopoly behavior must be de-
duced, not assumed, and that gains from cheating may exist even with as few as two
sellers).
107 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (deeming violators "guilty of a felony" and
subject to fines or imprisonment).
108 Side payments are ways of sharing profits. With side payments, some firms will pay
others, so a firm's profits are not necessarily equal to the difference between its sales reve-
nues and production costs.
109 Even if such commitments do not take the form of agreements among rivals, they
may facilitate horizontal collusion. See Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Hori-
zontal Consequences: Competitive Effects of "Most-Favored-Customer" Clauses, 64 Anti-
trust L.J. 517, 520-23 (1996) (discussing anticompetitive effects of most-favored-customer
provisions).
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"The difficulty of maintaining small-number cartels based upon de-
tailed communication and agreement should.., make us dubious that
concerted action without explicit collusion is likely to be at all com-
mon or successful."'"10
Such extreme skepticism about the possibility of coordination has
not worn well. Oligopolists often appear able to surmount these car-
tel problems and coordinate successfully. The active criminal enforce-
ment program of the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division
demonstrates that firms, even well-counseled corporate giants, do in-
deed fix prices."' Moreover, empirical research suggests that there is
a great deal of market power in some concentrated industries, and
that anticompetitive conduct is a significant cause of high price-cost
margins." 2 In addition, academic business strategists teach firms ac-
tively to facilitate coordination, as by adopting practices unilaterally
to address the industry's cartel problems.11 3 Finally, the contempo-
rary economic understanding of coordination, based on game-theo-
retic models of repeated interaction, actively shows that higher-than-
competitive pricing is plausible in many oligopolies, even if the firms
do not reach an agreement on price.
114
Firms can employ a number of methods to solve their cartel
problems without running afoul of the antitrust laws. The first cartel
problem, reaching consensus, arises because cooperating firms typi-
cally must select among a large number of outcomes-different mar-
ket prices and market shares-each of which is more profitable than
competition for all. These outcomes may yield different splits of joint
profits, so the firms may fail to agree on which should be chosen.
For example, the firms may sell a family of products in a wide
array of styles and sizes, as with automobile manufacturers. Suppose
that some of these firms primarily sell small cars while others prima-
rily sell large ones. The small-car specialists would like to arrange for
small-car prices to rise above the competitive levels, and they would
like to see large-car prices increase even more (in order to shift auto-
110 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 175 (1978).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 651-54 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing
cartel to raise price of food additive).
112 Bresnahan, supra note 86, at 1052-53.
113 See, e.g., Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy 93-95 (1980) (encouraging unilateral
signaling announcements, selective advertising to discipline recalcitrant rivals, and price
leadership). A common pedagogical device for teaching business students how to facilitate
coordination, based on the strategies followed by General Electric and Westinghouse dur-
ing the 1960s, is described in Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the
Electronic Marketplace, 65 Antitrust L.J. 41, 46 (1996).
114 See Baker, supra note 8, at 154-55 (discussing antitrust implications of "folk theo-
rem" for infinitely repeated games with observable actions).
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mobile demand to small cars). Conversely, the large-car specialists
would likely desire a lower large-car price and higher small-car price
than would the small-car specialists. It may be difficult for the firms
to harmonize their divergent interests, and thus to decide whether the
small- or large-car specialists will gain most of the profits from exercis-
ing market power. Given that auto makers differ on multiple impor-
tant dimensions (not just whether they emphasize large or small cars),
one might expect their negotiation problems to become insurmounta-
ble, particularly given antitrust law's prohibition against agreements
to raise price, and that coordination would fail because the firms
would be unable to solve the cartel problem of reaching a consensus.
Yet, this problem can be solved if some noncompetitive outcome
becomes "focal" (natural and obvious). If this does not occur natu-
rally, the firms can make an outcome focal without reaching an agree-
ment in violation of Sherman Act section 1, for example through price
leadership or other forms of information exchange. 115 In the automo-
bile case, one large firm might announce a common dollar or percent-
age price increase for all models (or perhaps one price increase for
small cars and a different one for large cars). Once a new set of prices
has become focal in this way, the others might follow naturally. Even
if there is some price jockeying-for example, the first firm raises
prices for all cars by five percent, the second raises large car prices
four percent and small car prices eight percent, and all firms match the
second firm-the use of across-the-board price increases (or common
price increases for large classes of products) can simplify the task of
reaching a consensus and make coordination practical for firms that
cannot communicate with each other about price.116
The airlines can be thought of as employing such general rules to
reach a consensus when they alter systemwide prices by a common
dollar amount or percentage. 117 The result might not maximize joint
profits of all the firms, and it could differ substantially from what any
firm would choose were it allowed to dictate prices for the industry,
but it may well lead to an outcome more profitable than competition
115 See, e.g., Svend Albek et al., Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A
Concrete Case, 45 J. Indus. Econ. 429, 440-41 (1997) (reporting that Danish government
action to gather and publish firm-specific transaction prices in concrete industry appeared
to facilitate coordination by inhibiting secret discounts).
116 See generally Baker, supra note 8, at 162-69 (discussing use of focal rules as basis of
coordination). This is an example of the use of what economists call "cheap talk" (non-
binding announcements) to facilitate selection of one outcome when many are possible.
117 See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying text. Firms also can adopt practices, unilat-
erally, that make it easier to reach consensus in this way, as business students are taught.
See supra note 113.
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for each (if the firms can also successfully deter cheating) and thus to
supracompetitive pricing.
Firms also can find ways to deter coordinating firms from cheat-
ing on the consensus high prices they identify. As with reaching a
consensus, this cartel problem is not necessarily insoluble, even by
firms careful to avoid violations of the Sherman Act. For example,
industry practices that encourage rapid detection of price cutting by
rivals and allow rapid rival response may deter cheating, as may infor-
mation sharing that clarifies whether price reductions result from
cheating, misunderstanding, or external factors. 118 Moreover, one of
the primary insights that emerged during the last two decades from
the mathematical reconstruction of industrial organization theory us-
ing game-theoretic arguments, is that repeated interaction among
oligopolists can discourage cheating."19 In a one-time interaction, it
typically would be profitable for a firm, having reached a consensus
with its rivals to charge a high price, to undercut that consensus. By
cutting price slightly, the firm can expect a great increase in sales, with
little reduction in the margin of price over cost.' 20
If, however, the interaction is repeated over time, the cost of
cheating in one period now includes the lost monopoly profits from
the likely breakdown of coordination in the future. Recognizing this
additional cost, the firm no longer may think it is worthwhile to steal
some extra profits by price cutting in the short run. Thus, when the
oligopoly interaction is viewed as dynamic rather than static, what
once appeared to be a powerful incentive to cheat on a higher-than-
competitive price may disappear, and high-price outcomes, once
achieved, are more readily sustainable.' 2'
118 See generally David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication and Col-
lusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 379 (2001)
(highlighting practices adopted by sugar-refining cartel to detect and police cheating). As
another example, firms can adopt facilitating practices unilaterally, like "most-favored-cus-
tomer" provisions in contracts with their customers, that raise their own costs of cheating
and so discourage deviation. For a general discussion of most-favored-customer provisions
see Baker, supra note 109, at 520-23.
119 See Luis M.B. Cabral, Introduction to Industrial Organization 130-31 (2000) (ex-
plaining that repeated interaction among firms promotes cartel stability by making long-
term losses from punishment large relative to short-term gains from cheating); Carl
Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization, supra
note 84, at 329, 363-66 (same).
120 All firms recognize that every competitor has an incentive to undercut a high price,
and that once any seller does, the rest must charge a lower price as well. Hence, no firm
will be willing to follow through on the high-price consensus in a one-time interaction. The
cartel price is not sustainable; the firms are led by individual profit-maximization to com-
pete rather than collude. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
121 See Baker, supra note 8, at 154-56 (describing "folk theorem" explaining how re-
peated interaction gives firms incentives to coordinate on supracompetitive pricing).
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B. Incomplete Coordination and Mavericks
The devices that make coordination work in this contemporary
economic perspective do not necessarily allow the coordinating firms
to achieve an outcome that would maximize the joint profits of the
sellers. Relative to what a monopolist would achieve, coordination is
likely to be imperfect and incomplete. This is the reason that certain
firms-mavericks-are likely to play a more significant role than their
rivals in constraining its effectiveness. 122 The term maverick may be
misleading, to the extent that it suggests that the firm must be a price-
cutter. The maverick indeed could be an observably disruptive force,
taking the lead in starting price wars or sales, but it also could keep
price from rising merely by refusing to follow rival attempts to raise
price. It is possible that the maverick would not be recognizable as a
holdout to the outside observer, as rivals would be expected not to
attempt to increase price unless they had reason to think that industry
conditions had changed in a way that would lead the maverick to go
along. As long as the maverick refuses to go along, there will be no
coordinated price increases, and all firms' prices will remain
competitive.
Coordination may be partly successful but nevertheless fall short
of joint-profit maximization-replicating the price a monopolist
would charge and the output it would sell-for a number of reasons,
including the following four.2 3 First, coordinating firms may not be
able to punish cheating rivals as strongly as would be necessary to
support a fully collusive price.124 The punishment can include output
expansion, matching the cheater's price, or even larger price cuts. In
122 See generally Baker, supra note 8, at 202-07.
123 This discussion presumes that the maverick is nearly indifferent between going along
with a high coordinated price and cheating on that price. It ignores the possibility that the
maverick instead may constrain coordination because it is nearly indifferent to participat-
ing in the punishment of cheaters necessary to deter deviation from the coordinated ar-
rangement. In addition to the reasons discussed in the text, the possibility that it is costly
for decisionmakers to analyze information and make choices could make coordination less
than fully successful. Cf. Ariel Rubenstein, Modeling Bounded Rationality 137-64 (1998)
(analyzing consequences of complexity in decisionmaking).
124 See John Haltiwanger & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., The Impact of Cyclical Demand
Movements on Collusive Behavior, 22 RAND J. Econ. 89, 98 (1991) (providing model in
which coordinating firms reduce price when demand is high but decreasing in order to
prevent cheating); Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, A Supergame-Theoretic Model of
Price Wars During Booms, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 390, 390 (1986) (providing model in which
coordinating firms cannot sustain high collusive prices when demand is high); see also
Genesove & Mullin, supra note 118, at 391-94 (reporting that sugar-refining cartel typically
responded to cheating with price matching); cf. Joseph Farrell, Renegotiation in Repeated
Oligopoly Interaction 3-4 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York
University Law Review) (arguing that steep punishments may not be credible when firms
can renegotiate, e.g., by agreeing to ignore transgressions "this time").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
April 2002]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
some cases, the necessary punishment may require that the punishing
firms charge prices below their marginal costs, yet this strategy may
require the firms to absorb substantial losses so the threat may not be
credible. For example, the major airlines generally appear to rely
upon prolonged price matching as a method of disciplining rivals
rather than employing deeper price reductions, 125 except when facing
small entrants who may have limited access to the capital markets.
126
The colluding firms instead may be willing to engage in a lesser pun-
ishment, such as responding to a cheating rival by merely returning
price to the competitive level, as would happen in any event were the
cartel to break down. While the threat of a lesser punishment for
cheating may be sufficient to induce all the firms to charge a price
substantially in excess of the competitive level (without cheating), it
may be insufficient to induce the firms to charge the price that a mo-
nopolist would set.
Second, coordinating firms may not be able to allocate the mo-
nopoly rents they achieve in a manner satisfactory to all the partici-
pants, because they may be unable to compensate each other
directly.127 In theory, for example, if most cartel members wanted to
charge a price of 150 while one refused to raise price above 125, the
other firms could induce the recalcitrant rival to accept a price above
125 by paying it to do so. In practice, however, such "side pay-
ments"'1 8 could be difficult to negotiate and impossible to enforce
given the risk that a prosecutor and court would infer an unlawful
(even criminal) agreement to fix price.
Third, when firms are uncertain as to the strategies their rivals are
pursuing and have difficulty inferring cheating from marketplace ob-
servations (e.g., against a "noisy" background in which prices fre-
125 In the airline price-fixing case from the early 1990s, however, the government identi-
fied stronger forms of punishment involving retaliation in other markets. See United
States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 59 Fed. Reg. 15,225 (Mar. 31, 1994) (competitive impact
statement) (describing alleged collusive scheme); United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co.,
58 Fed. Reg. 3971 (Jan. 12, 1993) (competitive impact statement) (same).
126 Major carriers allegedly have responded to small carrier entry by introducing service
into new markets, expanding capacity, and matching prices. See Transp. Research Bd.,
Nat'l Research Council, Entry and Competition in the U.S. Airline Industry 171-85 (1999)
[hereinafter Entry and Competition] (listing informal complaints to DOT by new entrant
airlines about unfair exclusionary practices, March 1993 to May 1999). But see United
States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1218 (D. Kan. 2001) (awarding American
Airlines summary judgment against predatory-pricing and conduct claims).
127 Margaret Levenstein interprets the largest price wars among U.S. bromine producers
between 1885 and 1914 as breakdowns of collusion resulting from disagreements among
cartel participants regarding the distribution of rents from collusion. Margaret C.
Levenstein, Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre-World War I
Bromine Industry, 45 J. Indus. Econ. 117, 135 (1997).
128 See supra note 108.
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quently fall for other reasons like unexpected declines in demand), the
coordinating firms may find it necessary to undertake expensive strat-
egies for deterring cheating.129 For example, they may reduce the
gains to cheating by lowering the price below the joint profit-maximiz-
ing level, or respond to the mere possibility of cheating by engaging in
a price war for some time before returning to higher prices. Indeed,
one of the surprising discoveries of the modem economic theory of
coordinated behavior is that occasional price wars-seemingly, the es-
sence of competition-are not inconsistent with coordination and may
even be part of the mechanism by which cheating is deterred during
high-price periods.130 But collusive pricing punctuated by occasional
price wars falls short of perfect coordination.
Fourth, the firms may have difficulty in identifying the joint-profit
maximizing outcome, especially when they must coordinate pricing
and output over a large number of products or markets without com-
municating. The coordination task could be a substantial one for the
airlines, for example, given the number of flights and ticketing options
each offers. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the airlines change
fares systemwide, using simple rules like a common percentage or dol-
lar price increase applied to a large class of routes and tickets, rather
than fine tuning price changes route by route and carrier by carrier to
maximize joint profits.
These difficulties of reaching joint profit maximization do not
necessarily make coordination impossible. They may instead lead to
occasional price reductions or price wars in response to shocks,'31 and
129 For example, Genesove and Mullin note that the sugar-refining cartel they studied
employed quasi-judicial internal dispute resolution procedures to reduce uncertainty and
detect cheating. Genesove & Mullin, supra note 118, at 387.
130 For theoretical and empirical perspectives relating price wars to uncertainty, see gen-
erally Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty: The U.S. Steel
Industry 1933-1939, J.L. & Econ., Oct. 1989, at S47 (Empirical Approaches to Market
Power Conference issue, part two of the second part of volume 32) (interpreting 1930s
steel industry price wars as cartel policing in face of uncertainty); Ellison, supra note 101
(analyzing 1880s rail industry price wars in context of imperfect information); Edward J.
Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information,
52 Econometrica 87 (1984) (providing pioneering theory suggesting price wars may not
rule out collusive behavior); Porter, supra note 101 (examining 1880s rail industry price
wars for evidence of collusive behavior under uncertainty); Margaret E. Slade, Cheating on
Collusive Agreements, 8 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 519 (1990) (suggesting that uncertainty is driv-
ing force behind cartel cheating).
131 Cf. Meghan R. Busse, Firm Financial Condition and Airline Price Wars 22,25 (Apr.
2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review) (finding
that carriers in poor financial condition are more likely than others to start airline price
wars). The price declines in response to shocks need not be large. See, e.g., Baker, supra
note 130, at S65, S66 n.66 (finding unanticipated four percent decline in demand prompted
one percent fall in price in 1930s steel industry); Levenstein, supra note 127, at 133 (report-
ing price declines of 4.4% and 6% in two price-war periods, and larger declines in others);
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to prices that are maintained above competitive levels but fall short of
monopoly levels. Of particular importance for antitrust analysis, they
also make it likely that incomplete coordination will be constrained by
a maverick firm.1 32 Incomplete coordination leads naturally to maver-
icks because coordination is not successful unless every significant
firm in the market prefers coordination to cheating. But when firms
differ, any firm that is nearly indifferent between coordination and
cheating will constrain efforts by its rivals to make coordination more
effective. Such a firm is the industry's maverick. 133 A numerical ex-
ample presented in an appendix to this Article illustrates how a mav-
erick can constrain coordination under repeated play when
coordination is incomplete.
C. What Is a Maverick? An Airline Industry Example
The role of mavericks in constraining coordination among oligo-
polists is suggested by the systemwide interaction among the major
U.S. passenger air carriers.134 One Friday in mid-February 2000, Con-
tinental Airlines, which had led implementation of a twenty dollar per
roundtrip fuel surcharge successfully three weeks earlier, raised prices
between twenty dollars and forty dollars per round trip (applying the
cf. Genesove & Mullin, supra note 118, at 393 (finding cheating on sugar-refining cartel
occurred without destroying coordinated arrangement).
132 Cf. Chaim Fershtman & Ariel Pakes, A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price
Wars, 31 RAND J. Econ. 207, 222 (2000) (discussing examples in which smallest or largest
firm in market would prefer to cheat while rivals would prefer to collude); Joseph E.
Harrington Jr., The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel,
32 Int'l Econ. Rev. 767, 783 (1991) (arguing that when coordinated equilibrium is selected
to satisfy Nash bargaining solution, equilibrium price may decline as high-cost firm's costs
increase); Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, Collusive Price Leadership, 39 J. Indus.
Econ. 93, 94 (1990) (noting that firms producing differentiated products constrained to
adopt common price typically have different preferences about what that price should be).
133 If all firms were identical, they presumably would want the same coordinated indus-
try price. Under such circumstances, all would be mavericks simultaneously. But this lim-
iting case is unlikely; as with the airlines, firms in most markets are different in ways that
affect their costs and matter to their customers. So long as firms cannot avoid the con-
straints that make coordination incomplete-here, their inability to reach a consensus on
multiple dimensions (like market share or quality of service as well as price), and their
inability to pay rivals to raise price or shut down-some firms can be expected to stop
wanting to improve coordination before its rivals are ready to do so, creating a maverick.
134 The author was an expert witness on behalf of the United States in United States v.
Northwest Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 1998). The case involved a
government challenge to Northwest's ownership of voting control of Continental, which
was dismissed after Northwest sold most of the contested shares. Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, Department Announces Tentative Settlement in Northwest-Continental Lawsuit
(Nov. 6, 2000) (on file with the New York University Law Review). The author also served
on the Committee for a Study of Competition in the U.S. Airline Industry that authored
Entry and Competition, supra note 126. The views expressed here are not necessarily
those of the Justice Department or the Transportation Research Board committee.
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highest increase to trips of more than 1000 miles).' 35 Five other major
carriers-American, Delta, TWA, United, and US Airways-matched
Continental's price increase over the weekend, but Northwest,
America West, and Southwest did not. Beginning Sunday night, the
airlines that had raised prices began to roll back the increases, and the
attempted price increase was aborted.
136
Three weeks later, once more on a Friday, Continental tried again
to implement the same schedule of price increases. By Sunday, six
other carriers-America West, American, Delta, TWA, United, and
US Airways-had matched the price increase, but Northwest and
Southwest had not. The Wall Street Journal observed that such price
increases generally are "doomed" if other major airlines do not match
quickly.' 37 Southwest might go its own way, the Journal noted, but
"the other airlines could lose their nerve and roll back their fares if
they believe Northwest won't go along by [Monday] morning. '1 38 In
fact, Northwest never went along. The price increases were rescinded,
so the attempt to raise prices "fizzled."'
1 39
The following Thursday, Northwest "reversed course" and raised
prices.140 Its price increase was similar in dollar magnitude to Conti-
nental's earlier proposals but was distributed differently. While Con-
tinental had sought to raise prices based on distance traveled,
Northwest implemented a price increase of up to twenty dollars on
most leisure tickets (those with substantial purchase restrictions) and
up to forty dollars on (unrestricted) business tickets. By Monday,
Northwest's price rise had been matched by all the big airlines except
Southwest, and was not rescinded.'
4 '
This story illustrates several well-known features of airline-indus-
try pricing. First, many price changes are implemented in a similar
manner over a carrier's entire route system. Such systemwide price
changes are long lasting. While some price setting is managed on a
route-by-route basis, systemwide price increases typically are not fol-
lowed by a flurry of route-specific price adjustments undermining the
135 Scott McCartney, Major Airlines Retreat from Attempt to Raise Fares to Cover
Higher Fuel Cost, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at A28.
136 Id.
137 Northwest, Southwest Hold Out on Increases in Round-Trip Fares, Wall St. J., Mar.
13, 2000, at A12.
138 Id.; see also infra note 144 (describing Southwest's special circumstances).
139 Melanie Trottman, Airlines Back Away from Fare Increase as Northwest Holds Its
Prices Steady, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 2000, at A6.
140 Susan Carey, Northwest, in Reversal, Increases Fares, a Move That Rivals Likely
Will Follow, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 2000, at A13.
141 Airline Fare Increase Started by Northwest Holds After Failures, Wall St. J., Mar. 20,
2000, at B19.
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systemwide price rise.142 Second, the carriers match each other's price
changes, and do so quickly. 143 Unless all major hub-and-spoke carri-
ers go along, a systemwide price increase will not be carried out na-
tionally. 44 Third, even though the airlines typically match systemwide
price changes, they all do not necessarily want the same price
change. 145 Fourth, a single carrier, here Northwest, constrains indus-
try pricing. In recent years, Northwest has done so frequently, and as
a result has been called the "industry maverick" or "spoiler.' 46 Over
142 It is likely cost effective to change prices in multiple city-pair markets simultane-
ously, given the large number of routes and ticketing options that each hub-and-spoke
carrier must price, and the frequency with which changing conditions affect some or all
city-pair markets in a carrier's system simultaneously. Accordingly, it is appropriate to
consider the possibility of systemwide competitive effects of an airline industry merger,
even if the underlying markets involve passenger travel on individual city-pair routes. Do-
ing so does not necessitate broadening the relevant market. In merger analysis generally,
when coordinated competitive effects are alleged, the significance of demand, supply, and
transactions complements should be taken into account in the competitive effects analysis
rather than during market definition. See Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of
Hospital Mergers and the Transformation of the Hospital Industry, L. & Contemp. Probs.,
Spring 1988, at 93, 123-40 (discussing problems with cluster approach to market definition
and suggesting pragmatic approach to product clusters).
143 The carriers match fares because they fear that passengers would switch in response
to a fare differential, at least if the rival is a significant one. While most passengers will not
change their travel plans if all carriers raise prices a small amount, enough will switch from
one carrier to another in response to a small price difference to make it unprofitable for
any carrier to allow a significant rival to undercut it, even slightly. Rapid price matching is
not unique to airlines. For example, it was commonplace in the sugar industry around
1930, during the heyday of the sugar refining cartel managed by the Sugar Institute. See
Genesove & Mullin, supra note 118, at 392 (pointing to existence of Sugar Institute reports
that "permitted quick, nearly contemporaneous [price-matching] responses").
144 Southwest, America West, Alaska, and smaller carriers need not go along for the
price increase to succeed. Southwest is as large as some of the major hub-and-spoke carri-
ers, but it offers primarily low-cost, point-to-point service, often to secondary airports in
major metropolitan areas. America West and Alaska have smaller and more regionalized
networks than the major hub-and-spoke carriers.
145 Different preferences are not surprising because the carriers tend to differ on a num-
ber of dimensions potentially relevant to pricing, including market shares; capacity utiliza-
tion rates (load factors) and their determinants (such as national and regional economic
conditions); costs of service (including labor issues such as the possibility of a strike); mix
of business and leisure passengers; mix of local and connecting passengers; route structure;
airport presence; service timing, quality, and frequency; frequent flyer programs; travel
agent incentive programs; financial strength; and reputation for service and safety. Many
of these factors may vary over time.
146 See, e.g., Susan Carey, Airlines' Fare Increase Is Imperiled as Delta, American Air
Rescind Boost, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1999, at A4; Susan Carey, Northwest Follows Suit on
Fare Rise, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1999, at A3; Scott McCartney, Northwest Air Undermines
Attempt to Raise Fares, Wall St. J., Aug. 11, 1998, at A3; Melanie Trottman, Fare Increase
by Major Airlines Stalls with Northwest, Delta Not Being Aboard, Wall St. J., May 22,
2001, at A16. In earlier years, however, other carriers may have played the role of sys-
temwide maverick. Similarly, when prices are altered on specific city-pair routes-the un-
derlying markets-the identity of the route-specific maverick can vary by route. Cf. Entry
and Competition, supra note 126, at 70 (noting that majority of passengers fly on routes
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the same time period, no other carrier has played a similar role con-
sistently in the systemwide competition among the major airlines.
With price matching but different preferences, the systemwide
price rise that is established will have the scope and magnitude that is
preferred by the carrier that seeks the smallest (meaning lowest and
narrowest) price increase.147 It is as though every significant carrier
were polled as to which price increase it would select for all to adopt,
and the industry price rise were set at the lowest price boost an-
nounced by any firm. The firm that prefers the lowest price increase
can prevent prices from rising further merely by refusing to match a
larger price increase; it need not initiate a price war. That carrier,
Northwest in the example, is the industry maverick.
The interpretation placed on Northwest's conduct-that North-
west is constraining airline industry coordination-presumes that in-
dustry behavior reasonably can be understood as coordinated. Yet,
based solely on the above description, which emphasizes parallel pric-
ing, airline conduct would not necessarily be termed coordinated, and
the resulting prices would not necessarily be expected to exceed com-
petitive levels. As has long been understood, parallel pricing could
reflect competition or collusion.148 Other evidence must be used to
discriminate between competition and market power, and determine
whether market power is achieved through coordination or
unilaterally.
The competitive benchmark for airline pricing, against which the
possibility of market power must be measured, is not carrier marginal
cost, as this is an industry where marginal-cost pricing likely would be
insufficient to cover fixed and common costs. Rather, carriers can be
expected to charge some or all passengers a price in excess of margi-
served by no more than two carriers). For example, competition from Southwest has low-
ered fares in many city-pair markets. While the firm might be a maverick with respect to
competition within those markets, it does not participate in the systemwide competition
among the carriers and thus does not play the maverick role in that competition. See id. at
30-35, 49-55 (highlighting role of Southwest as low-fare carrier, and firm's strategy of em-
phasizing point-to-point service on dense short-haul routes rather than creating hub-and-
spoke route network).
147 In the example, Northwest changed the structure of the price increase and delayed
its implementation. Had Northwest merely moved first in implementing an industrywide
price rise, it would not have been clear whether Northwest was constraining industry price
increases.
148 Coordinating firms might raise prices simultaneously in order to exercise market
power. Competing firms also might raise prices simultaneously, in response to a common
cost increase or an increase in market demand. Accordingly, "'conscious parallelism' has
not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely." Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).
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nal cost even under competition.149 If the airlines are constrained by
competitive forces from exercising market power, it is by the threat of
rapid and inexpensive entry.150
If the airline industry were performing competitively, industry
outcomes thus would be understood best as consistent with what
economists would term a "contestable" market.151 This competitive
benchmark, however, is implausible as a description of actual airline
pricing. Industry conduct is, instead, better understood as the product
of some form of oligopoly conduct that generates market power.' 52
The primary evidence against the contestable-market hypothesis
comes from the many economic studies generating results inconsistent
with the free-entry requirement for contestability.' 53 Other implica-
149 Free entry is not necessarily inconsistent with price discrimination, so long as the
entrant's products are not perfect substitutes for those of incumbents. See Severin
Borenstein, Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets, 16 Rand J. Econ. 380, 394 (1985)
(arguing that free entry alone generally will not prevent price discrimination when brand
preferences are strong); cf. Lars A. Stole, Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly, 4 J. Econ. &
Mgmt. Strategy 529, 550, 555 (1995) (noting conditions under which uniform pricing is not
an equilibrium when nonlinear pricing is possible).
150 In a market in which competitive outcomes are generated by free entry, the competi-
tive price is effectively the entrant average cost, which could exceed incumbent marginal
cost. Thus, a recent report advocates policies designed to generate outcomes closer to
what would be produced by free entry with price discrimination. Entry and Competition,
supra note 126, at 24-26.
151 In a contestable market, the potential for rapid and inexpensive entry would deter or
counteract any exercise of market power, no matter how small the number of incumbent
firms.
152 The authors of the contestability theory have observed that their "initial enthusiasm"
for viewing the airline industry this way required "reconsideration," and that the "industry
does not conform perfectly to the contestability model." William J. Baumol & Robert D.
Willig, Contestability: Developments Since the Book, in Strategic Behaviour and Indus-
trial Competition 9, 24-27 (D.J. Morris et al. eds., 1986).
153 First, entry into city-pair markets often fails, the exception being entry by Southwest.
Measuring success by the maintenance of new origin/destination pairs with at least a five
percent share one year after entry, Bamberger and Carlton find that over forty percent of
new service offered by major carriers failed during the 1990-1997 period, and an even
higher fraction of low-fare carrier entry failed. Gustavo E. Bamberger & Dennis W.
Carlton, An Empirical Assessment of Predation in the Airline Industry 4-6 (Nov. 10, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review). Taken at
face value, these estimates suggest a substantial failure rate for entry. Moreover, they
likely understate that rate. Bamberger and Carlton employ a definition of entry that likely
is dominated by expansion of service by incumbent carriers, either nonstop carriers adding
more nonstop flights or connecting carriers adding more connecting flights. In either case,
the carriers may have had established reputations in a city-pair market before they ex-
panded service, giving them survival advantages not enjoyed by de novo entrants. They
also may be participating already in the oligopoly interaction in that market. Accordingly,
the failure rate for the introduction of daily nonstop service by a carrier not presently
offering it-the kind of entry most likely to compete away supracompetitive oligopoly pric-
ing-likely is higher than the rate Bamberger and Carlton observe.
Second, studies of a number of mid-1980s airline industry mergers, including TWA/
Ozark and Republic/Northwest, have found that those deals led to higher fares, and price
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tions of the competitive benchmark story also seem implausible,154
increases were not deterred or competed away by new entrants. See E. Han Kim & Vijay
Singal, Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from the Airline Industry, 83 Am. Econ.
Rev. 549, 550 (1993) (finding airline merges between 1985 and 1988 led to higher fares);
see also Severin Borenstein, Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power, 80
Am. Econ. Rev. 400, 404 (1990) (finding only small price increases at St. Louis following
TWA/Ozark combination but significant price hikes at Minneapolis after Republic/North-
west deal); Gregory J. Werden, Andrew S. Joskow & Richard L. Johnson, The Effects of
Mergers on Price and Output: Two Case Studies from the Airline Industry, 12 Managerial
& Decision Econ. 341, 348 (1991) (same).
Third, contrary to the prediction of the contestability theory, high fares do not induce
entry, prices and output are not always at competitive levels but are affected by the num-
ber and size of actual and potential rivals on a route, and hub networks create entry barri-
ers. See Severin Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the
U.S. Airline Industry, 20 RAND J. Econ. 344, 345 (1989) (noting factors permitting air-
port-dominant carriers to deter entry); Gloria J. Hurdle et al., Concentration, Potential
Entry, and Performance in the Airline Industry, 38 J. Indus. Econ. 119, 137 (1989) (finding
that prices are best explained by measures of concentration incorporating number and size
distribution of incumbents and number of potential entrants); Andrew S. Joskow et al.,
Entry, Exit, and Performance in Airline Markets, 12 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 457, 469 (1994)
(observing that high cost-corrected prices on given city-pair do not generally induce entry);
Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Empirical Implications and Tests of the Contest-
ability Hypothesis, 30 J.L. & Econ. 53, 60 (1987) (showing that in one study both number
of potential entrants and number of actual competitors affected welfare per traveler-mile);
Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Dynamics of Airline Pricing and Competi-
tion, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 389, 392 (1990) (citing finding that "fares are higher on routes
with greater carrier concentration at airports"); Robert A. Sinclair, An Empirical Model of
Entry and Exit in Airline Markets, 10 Rev. Indus. Org. 541, 542 (1995) (noting that entry is
less likely at airports that are part of incumbent's large hub system).
Fourth, entry by nonmajor carriers will be discouraged by the entrant's reasonable
expectation of an aggressive competitive response by incumbents. See Patrick Bolton et
al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 Geo. L.J. 2239,2261-62 (2000)
(discussing locally dominant airlines' predatory pricing strategies in response to new entry
of independent carriers); Scott McCartney, Upstart's Tactics Allow It to Fly in Friendly
Skies of a Big Rival, Wall St. J., June 23, 1999, at BI (reporting that aggressive competition
by small carrier was discouraged by dominant carrier's pricing strategy). Incumbent air-
lines face limited antitrust risk in mounting such a response, given the high legal hurdles
impeding successful proof of monopolization through predatory pricing. See, e.g., United
States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1193-96 (D. Kan. 2001) (acknowledging high
standard of proof for predatory pricing in context of airline case); cf. Brooke Group v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,231-32 (1993) (rejecting predatory pric-
ing claim on basis that evidence failed to show defendant had "a reasonable prospect of
recovering its losses from below-cost pricing"); Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After
Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 Antitrust LJ. 585, 599 (1994) (noting that
Brooke Group majority presumed predatory pricing was implausible, ignoring record evi-
dence arguably demonstrating it).
Finally, entry by foreign carriers into domestic U.S. markets generally is prohibited by
statute. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2), (a)(15) (1994) (defining air carrier to exclude corpo-
rations in which non-U.S. citizens own more than twenty-five percent of voting stock);
§ 41102 (providing mechanism by which U.S. citizen air carriers may obtain air transporta-
tion authority).
154 First, if free entry is protecting consumers from high prices in a market in which firms
sell multiple products and the prices on many individual products exceed marginal cost,
then the entry constraint essentially is capping the total contribution to profits (revenues
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and the structure of passenger airline markets likely would not pre-
clude the firms from reaching a consensus and detecting and respond-
ing to cheating on it.155
Moreover, carrier behavior is understood better as coordinated
rather than unilateral. 56 That is, the firms interact repeatedly and ap-
less variable costs) derived from each incumbent firm's products taken as a group. The
implausible implication is that if prices for some product (here airline tickets) rise, other
prices must simultaneously be cut to preserve the total contribution.
Second, the competitive benchmark story does not allow the firms to interact strategi-
cally, considering the likely response of rivals when making pricing and other competitive
decisions. Yet strategic behavior is commonly presumed by industry analysts. It is consis-
tent with the empirical evidence, see James A. Brander & Anming Zhang, Dynamic Oli-
gopoly Behaviour in the Airline Industry, 11 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 407, 433 (1993) (finding
"substantial implicit coordination" among airlines during 1984-1988 period), and it was
central to the conduct alleged by the Justice Department in its early 1990s price-fixing case
against the major airlines. See United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 59 Fed. Reg.
15,225, 15,230-32 (Mar. 31, 1994) (competitive impact statement) (describing strategic pric-
ing behavior among airlines); United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 58 Fed. Reg. 3971,
3976-79 (Jan. 12, 1993) (competitive impact statement) (same). In one type of agreement
alleged by the Justice Department, "[t]he soliciting airline would use fare basis codes, last
ticket dates and footnote designators to communicate to the disruptive competitor, and
other interested airlines, the limited reason (punishment) for the soliciting airline's dis-
count and its willingness to eliminate the discount in exchange for the competitor eliminat-
ing the original discount," Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,231.
155 The prospect of entry likely would not deter coordination. See supra note 153 and
accompanying text. The carriers also have tools potentially available to help them solve
the other cartel problems. They may be able to reach a consensus through leader-follower
behavior on price, while preventing destabilizing shifts in market shares by refraining from
major alterations in service frequencies and equipment on the routes they serve. (In the
airline industry, where prices are routinely matched rapidly, the carriers regularly forecast
market-share shifts on individual routes based primarily on variation in the capacity (fre-
quency and seats) of the aircraft devoted to the route.) See Barry C. Smith et al., Airline
Planning and Marketing Decision Support: A Review of Current Practices and Future
Trends, in Handbook of Airline Marketing 117, 120-21 (Gail F. Butler & Martin R. Keller
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Handbook of Airline Marketing] (explaining that common type of
market-share forecast employs Quality of Service Index (QSI)); Benson B. Yuen &
Michael E. Irrgang, The New Generation of Revenue Management: A Network Perspec-
tive, in Handbook of Airline Marketing, supra, at 319, 327-28 (explaining that airline can
estimate competitors' load factors using QSI data). The carriers can detect rival price cut-
ting rapidly through the information exchange required to make prices available to travel
agents and passengers, and can respond quickly. See Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 59 Fed.
Reg. at 15,232 (competitive impact statement) (explaining how computerized fare dissemi-
nation system makes possible prompt punishment of price cutter); Airline Tariff Publ'g
Co., 58 Fed. Reg. at 3977 (competitive impact statement) (noting that electronic fare-dis-
semination "ensures that any airline's fare changes can be detected easily and rapidly").
Moreover, the most attractive methods available to the carriers for cheating-expanded
Internet discounts, expanded corporate discounts, and adding leisure seats (rather than
holding those seats for last-minute business travelers)-would not allow any firm to steal
much of the market rapidly without detection and response. This is because only a fraction
of the passengers served annually by the carriers are in the market seeking to purchase
tickets during any plausible time period for undetected cheating.
156 A maverick also constrains airline pricing under the most plausible unilateral theory,
"quick response." Under this form of oligopoly conduct, firms respond to rival price cut-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 77:135
MAVERICKS, MERGERS, AND EXCLUSION
pear to follow competitive strategies that take into account past con-
duct by rivals. 157 But coordination appears to be imperfect and
incomplete, leaving prices well below what the airlines would charge
were they maximizing joint profits. Industry participants generally
consider the demand for business tickets to be inelastic, suggesting
that prevailing prices are below what perfectly colluding carriers
would charge. It is not surprising that the carriers would fall short of
acting collectively as if they were a monopolist. Carriers may have
difficulty credibly committing to the severe punishment of rivals who
might be tempted to cheat on a coordinated outcome. Moreover, an-
titrust concerns would inhibit both communications aimed at prevent-
ing rivals from misinterpreting as cheating efforts to negotiate
complex patterns of price changes, and side payments to induce the
maverick to raise price more than it is willing to do on its own.'58
Parallel pricing in the airline industry thus is interpreted best as
resulting from imperfect coordination, rather than competition, the
unilateral exercise of market power, or complete coordination. This is
the setting in which a maverick firm would be expected to constrain
coordination from becoming more effective or complete. With re-
spect to systemwide pricing interaction of the major carriers, that role
has in recent years commonly been played by Northwest.
D. Identifying the Maverick
Three strategies are available for antitrust enforcers and courts to
employ to identify the maverick in an industry in which firms are co-
ting without delay, but they do not follow pricing or output strategies that recognize re-
peated interaction. See Robert M. Anderson, Quick-Response Equilibrium 11-12 (Inst. of
Bus. & Econ. Research, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper IP-323, 1984) (explaining
that "the strategy of matching price cuts is a quick-response equilibrium, that supports an
outcome that is... the most collusive possible"); V. Bhaskar, The Kinked Demand Curve:
A Game-Theoretic Approach, 6 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 373, 374-75 (1988) ("The ability of
firms to respond without delay to undercutting ensures that the unique noncooperative
equilibrium is collusive.. .. "); Severin Borenstein, Rapid Price Communication and Coor-
dination: The Airline Tariff Publishing Case (1994), in The Antitrust Revolution: Eco-
nomics, Competition, and Policy 310,313-14 (John E. Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds.,
3d ed. 1999) (discussing quick-response model in context of airline pricing); Robert H.
Gertner, The Rule of Firm Asymmetries for Tacit Collusion in Markets with Immediate
Competitive Responses 5-6, 23 (Apr. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New
York University Law Review) (same). Accordingly, the implications of the quick-response
unilateral theory for antitrust enforcement are similar to those of the coordination theory.
157 See supra note 154 (discussing strategic behavior in airline industry).
158 The consent settlements of the Justice Department's airline price-fixing from the
early 1990s limit some of the tools the carriers allegedly employed to make complex cross-
market bargains. See Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,227 (proposed final
judgment) (prohibiting, e.g., dissemination of first-ticket dates, last-ticket dates, and super-
fluous footnote designators); Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 58 Fed. Reg. at 3972 (proposed final
judgment) (same).
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ordinating, though none is guaranteed to succeed.159 The first such
strategy might be termed revealed preference: The maverick might be
identified by observing that it actually constrains industry pricing.
This was how Northwest was found to be the maverick in the airline
industry example, and how the maverick was identified in JTC Petro-
leum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc.160 When Northwest, alone among
significant firms, failed to raise prices in the airline example, the other
carriers were forced to rescind the price increases. Moreover, North-
west played the maverick role for a period of years,161 while no other
carrier acted similarly in the systemwide competition among the major
airlines, suggesting that Northwest likely would continue in that
role.
162
The second approach looks for natural experiments to identify the
firm that constrains industry pricing. Some factors likely affecting the
market price preferred by the maverick are firm specific. For exam-
ple, a firm's marginal costs may rise or fall for reasons related to the
nature or location of its production processes, and in consequence
may not be paralleled by cost changes affecting its rivals. 163 If that
firm is a maverick, the market price will change; if another firm is the
maverick, the market price will not.164 This idea can be exploited to
159 This discussion ignores the possibility that colluding firms have boosted price up to
the level at which a new competitor would be expected to enter the market. If so, the
potential entrant, rather than any incumbent firm, is effectively the maverick.
160 190 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1999). This case is discussed infra at notes 244-56 and accom-
panying text. Another possible example of a maverick thought to constrain coordination
by virtue of its observable marketplace conduct is a century old. Professor Scherer consid-
ers Andrew Carnegie to have been the steel industry's "most aggressive competitor" at the
end of the nineteenth century, and in essence explains the creation of the United States
Steel Corporation in 1901 as an effort by Carnegie's rivals to end steel industry price com-
petition by buying him out. F.M. Scherer, Industry Structure, Strategy, and Public Policy
148-50 (1996).
161 See supra note 146.
162 The inference that a recent maverick, even one that has played the maverick role for
a while, will continue to do so in the future could be strengthened by tying the firm's
incentive to constrain industry coordination to features of firm or market structure that are
unlikely to change over time. Such features are termed a priori factors in the discussion
below. See infra notes 166-73 and accompanying text. Even without such links, a consis-
tent pattern over several years, as in airlines, leads reasonably to the inference that the past
maverick is likely to continue in that role, and thus provides a reasonable basis for policy
analysis. In contrast, if the identity of the industry maverick may change frequently and
unpredictably, the analysis of coordinated competitive effects is addressed better through
the structural presumption than through the identification of a maverick. See infra Part V.
163 Other potential sources of natural experiments involve firm-specific variation in the
a priori factors discussed infra at notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
164 This discussion ignores the possibility that a firm-specific cost reduction (or other
source of natural experiment) may turn a nonmaverick into a maverick, and the possibility
that a firm-specific cost reduction may change a nonmaverick firm's behavior in a way that
affects maverick incentives (as by altering punishment threats).
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"test" which firm is the maverick if the necessary data are available
and sufficiently numerous natural experiments occur within the sam-
ple period.1
65
The third approach, which may be termed the a priori factors ap-
proach, relies on understanding the reasons a firm would prefer a high
or low price in the particular market under investigation. For exam-
ple, documentary evidence cited by the district court in a recent
merger case indicated that in the drug wholesaling industry, excess
capacity creates price pressure.166 If this is indeed the driving force
behind firm preferences as to the industry price, and the firms are
coordinating, a firm with substantially greater excess capacity than
most of its rivals (either absolutely or relative to sales) is likely to be
the industry maverick. Another example of the use of a priori factors
to identify a maverick comes from the cigarette industry: Liggett may
have been a maverick during the 1980s and 1990s in part because,
uniquely among the major cigarette manufacturers, it had a primary
commitment to the discount segment of the cigarette market.167
A variety of structural characteristics might give a firm a greater
economic incentive to prefer a lower coordinated price than do its
rivals or otherwise deviate from terms of coordination when its rivals
would not.168 One intuition comes from thinking about the forces
favoring a higher coordinated price versus a lower one from the per-
spective of an individual firm. The increased profits that would result
from a higher coordinated price come from increasing the price-cost
margin on the output that the firm would continue to sell. This bene-
165 For a description of how to undertake such a test under the assumption that the same
firm is the maverick throughout the sample period, see Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 1 Am. L. &
Econ. Rev. 386, 404-05 (1999). If the identity of the maverick could change over the sam-
ple period, the statistical analysis would require a selection equation as well. Other empiri-
cal methods of identifying coordination or collusion do not focus on the role of the
maverick but do share with this approach the idea of comparing industry behavior to a
competitive benchmark. See Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, Detection of Bid Rig-
ging in Procurement Auctions, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 518,530 (1993) (proposing examination of
behavioral differences between cartel and competitive bidders); Robert H. Porter & J.
Douglas Zona, Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding, 30 RAND J. Econ.
263, 264-65 (1999) (concluding that bidding behavior of alleged colluders differed from
that of other firms); Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, Competition Versus Collusion in Procure-
ment Auctions: Identification and Testing 2 (Feb. 20, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the New York University Law Review) (explaining conditions of "conditional inde-
pendence" and "exchangeability" as competitive benchmark for evaluating bidding).
166 FrC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63-64 (D.D.C. 1998).
167 See infra notes 257-79 and accompanying text.
168 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.12; see Baker, supra note 8, at 203-04 n.21
(discussing structural characteristics that might make firm's incentive to cheat greater than
that of its rivals).
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fit likely will be greater, among other things, the larger the firm's mar-
ket share. The increased profits that would result from instead
lowering the coordinated price come from increasing the quantity
sold. If industry sales would rise substantially, and if the firm gets a
significant proportion of the increased industry sales, then the firm's
profits might rise, notwithstanding a reduction in its price-cost margin.
The increase in profits likely will be greater, among other things, the
greater the firm's ability to expand sales inexpensively. 69 Thus, in
identifying its preferred coordinated price for the industry, each firm
will weigh the benefits of a higher coordinated price, which may be
related importantly to its market share, with the benefits of a lower
coordinated price, which may be related importantly to its ability to
expand sales inexpensively. 170
The Merger Guidelines provide two examples of a priori factors
tending to identify a likely maverick. The examples compare industry
participants on dimensions suggested by the above intuitions. First,
in a market where capacity constraints are significant for many com-
petitors, a firm is more likely to be a maverick the greater is its
excess or divertible capacity in relation to its sales or its total capac-
ity, and the lower are its direct and opportunity costs of expanding
sales in the relevant market.171
Second, "[a] firm also may be a maverick if it has an unusual ability
secretly to expand its sales in relation to the sales it would obtain if it
169 Firms also might prefer a lower industry price during times of financial distress in
order to shift revenues from the future to the present, or to reassure lenders by improving
the predictability of cash flows. Cf. Busse, supra note 131, at 22-25 (finding that carriers in
poor financial condition are more likely than others to start airline price wars).
170 As this discussion emphasizes, in identifying a maverick through a priori factors, the
primary focus generally should be on the question of whether a higher or lower coordi-
nated price likely would be profitable for the firm, not on whether cheating would be
profitable. But cf. Baker, supra note 8, at 203 (suggesting that unusual ability to attract
sales away from rivals through price cuts also could encourage firm to play role of maver-
ick). Under some circumstances, however, it is possible that a firm's preference for a lower
coordinated price would instead be driven by factors that affect its incentives to go along
with the punishment that would be required by the terms of the coordinated arrangement
in the event deviation were to occur, as previously noted at supra note 123.
171 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.12. The Guidelines explain:
This is so because a firm's incentive to deviate from price-elevating and out-
put-limiting terms of coordination is greater the more the firm is able profita-
bly to expand its output as a proportion of the sales it would obtain if it
adhered to the terms of coordination and the smaller is the base of sales on
which it enjoys elevated profits prior to the price cutting deviation.
Id. The author is aware of two nonpublic merger investigations, one at each federal anti-
trust agency, where a firm with relatively high excess capacity was viewed by some as a
maverick constraining coordination. In one case, the merger did not involve the maverick,
and was not challenged; in the other case the merger would have removed a maverick, and
the transaction was abandoned after agency opposition became clear.
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adhered to the terms of coordination," as might arise "from opportu-
nities to expand captive production for a downstream affiliate.' 72 In
some cases, however, the a priori factors might not point exclusively in
one direction. Firms that are high in one factor encouraging low
prices may be low in others, making it difficult to identify the maver-
ick in this manner.17 3
i
MAVERICKS AND MERGERS
The airline example illustrates how a focus on identifying the
maverick can allow antitrust to go beyond the structural presumption
by providing a mechanism that explains why the loss of a firm through
merger or exclusion will improve coordination. Moreover, the con-
cept of a maverick can operate as sword or shield in merger review,
helping distinguish anticompetitive mergers from procompetitive
ones. A range of possible competitive consequences of mergers will
be treated in the discussion below.
A. Mergers Involving the Maverick
1. Removing the Maverick's Constraint on Coordination
If Northwest is indeed the airline industry maverick, constraining
more effective coordination, that observation should be central to the
antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers or exclusionary practices in
the airline industry. With respect to mergers involving the maverick,
the concern is that a hypothetical merger involving Northwest may
harm competition by removing the maverick from the marketplace.
Absent cognizable efficiencies from the transaction, 174 the merged
firm most likely would prefer higher fares than Northwest desired on
its own (though presumably lower fares than its merger partner previ-
ously would have sought). If so, the merger could remove a constraint
172 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 2.12; cf. B.F. Goodrich Co., 110 F.T.C. 207,
329-38 (1988) (discussing effects of asymmetric vertical integration relative to rivals on
firm's incentive to deviate from coordinated understanding limited to upstream market).
173 In the airline industry, a wide range of factors potentially could lead a firm to prefer
a smaller route-specific or systemwide price increase than that favored by its rivals. These
factors may include lower market share, lower variable costs, lower demand, lower load
factor (capacity utilization rate), less financial strength, less attractive route structure,
lesser airport presence, lower service quality, less attractive frequent flyer programs, and
weaker reputation (as from crashes or strikes).
174 Under the Merger Guidelines, efficiencies are cognizable if they are verified, merger
specific, and not a disguised anticompetitive effect. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3,
§ 4 (revised 1997).
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on more effective coordination, and lead to higher fares
nationwide. 175
Here, the concept of a maverick could operate as a sword, ex-
plaining precisely why the particular increase in market concentration
generated by merger is likely to lead to higher prices. In the absence
of the constraint on coordination posed by the airline industry maver-
ick, which often has been Northwest in recent times, prices would be
expected to rise. How far would depend on the preferences of the
carrier who would become the maverick in Northwest's place. If this
potential maverick favored keeping industry prices nearly as low as
Northwest did, then prices would not rise a great deal. That outcome,
however, would be unlikely. The major airlines with hub-and-spoke
route networks are sufficiently few in number, and sufficiently differ-
ent in their characteristics, as to make it plausible that prices would
rise substantially following the disappearance of the maverick.
A simple numerical example may clarify why prices would rise.
Assume that Northwest is the maverick with respect to systemwide
competition, and that an airline's prices can be summarized with a
single index number. Premerger airline prices are at 100, the level
preferred by the maverick, Northwest. Had the other carriers been
polled as to their preferred price level, Continental would have fa-
vored an industry price index of 125 while all other major carriers,
including Delta, would have preferred to allow the industry price
index to rise to 150.176 If Delta were to acquire Northwest, the
merged firm would be expected to prefer an industry price level in
between what Northwest and Delta individually favored premerger,
for example, 120. Under such circumstances, and assuming that the
merger has no effect on the industry price level preferred by any other
carrier, the price index would be expected to rise from 100, the level at
which Northwest kept it at before being acquired, to 120, the level the
175 See, e.g., United States v. ALCOA, 377 U.S. 271, 280-81 (1964) (Rome Cable) (up-
holding challenge to loss of small "aggressive competitor" in market dominated by three
large firms); B.F. Goodrich Co., 110 F.T.C. 207, 329-38 (1988) (prohibiting merger involv-
ing firm with incentive to deviate from upstream coordination as result of asymmetric ver-
tical integration relative to its rivals); United States v. Premdor Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 45,326,
45,336-37 (Aug. 28, 2001) (competitive impact statement) (alleging harm to competition
from merger involving firm with incentive to deviate from downstream coordination as
result of asymmetric vertical integration relative to its rivals); Mahle GmbH, 62 Fed. Reg.
10,566, 10,567 (FTC Mar. 7, 1997) (analysis to aid public comment on proposed consent
agreement) (finding that merger substantially lessened competition in four-firm market by
giving control of "an aggressive and innovative competitor" to "one of only two firms that
together have dominated the market").
176 Recall that when coordination is imperfect, the remaining firms cannot employ side
payments and punishment strategies sufficient to induce Northwest and Continental to
prefer a price closer to 150.
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merged firm now prefers. Here the merged firm remains the maver-
ick, but the merger raises the industry price by increasing the maver-
ick's preferred price. Had the merged firm instead preferred an
industry price index of 130, prices still would have risen, but only to
125, the index level preferred by Continental, the firm that then would
become the new industry maverick.
2. Tightening the Maverick's Constraint on Coordination
It is also possible, though markedly less likely, that a merger in-
volving Northwest may enhance the maverick's incentives to keep
price low. This secondary possibility is less likely because it requires
the transaction to generate large variable cost savings for the merged
entity (or other substantial efficiencies capable of benefiting buyers,
such as providing the merged firm with the ability to launch new prod-
ucts). If it were unusually costly for Northwest to expand output pre-
merger, and were it thus plausible that an acquisition would lower its
variable costs substantially, it would be unlikely that Northwest would
have chosen to constrain coordination premerger; its premerger incen-
tive more likely would have been to go along with higher prices.
Moreover, this possibility also requires that the merged firm's incen-
tive to lower price, resulting from those variable cost savings, domi-
nate any incentive to increase price that arises from combining the
maverick with a firm that previously would have sought higher
fares.177 Under such circumstances, the merger would be procompeti-
tive, as it would lead the maverick to seek even lower prices than
before.'7 8 Because the acquisition of a maverick appears substantially
more likely to harm competition than to promote it, the courts plausi-
bly might develop a rebuttable presumption that such a transaction
would harm competition.179
177 For this possibility to be credible, the efficiencies must be so large as to make the
expected postmerger profits exceed the sum of the premerger profits for the two firms,
taking into account the likelihood that industry prices will fall.
178 In terms of the numerical example in the previous subsection, it is as though the
efficiencies from the acquisition cause the merged firm's preferred industry price to fall to
ninety. Under such circumstances, the merged firm would lower prices and the other firms
would follow.
179 Such a rule would be unlikely to have adverse second-order incentive effects. It is
implausible, for example, that a firm that would otherwise find it individually profitable to
keep prices from rising, instead would decide to allow industry prices to increase, at a
sacrifice of short term profits, in order to avoid being identified as a maverick by antitrust
enforcers when making a future horizontal acquisition. Moreover, to the extent second-
order effects are important, they may be equally procompetitive: A firm may choose to
lower prices and constrain coordination in order to appear to be a maverick as a part of a
regulatory strategy to fend off a threatened hostile takeover.
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B. Mergers Involving Nonmavericks
The assumption that Northwest is the industry maverick, con-
straining more effective coordination, would also bear on the analysis
of industry mergers not involving that firm. Consider, for example, a
merger that was proposed in the spring of 2001 between United and
US Airways.180 In theory, and without taking a view as to the likely
competitive effects of the actual transaction, 181 that merger could have
affected the industry price in several ways. These possibilities will be
used to frame the analysis below. However, it is not the purpose of
this Article to evaluate the actual United/US Airways merger propo-
sal, or to determine which, if any, of these theories would have cap-
tured best its likely competitive significance.
1. No Effect on the Maverick's Incentives
In the most straightforward scenario involving a merger of
nonmavericks, the transaction may have no effect on competition. If
Northwest is the industry maverick, it may continue to constrain
prices after the merger, much as it did before.182 If so, the concept of
a maverick would operate as a shield to undermine an antitrust chal-
lenge to a merger that increases market concentration. A litigated
example is provided by New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc. 183
The Kraft case involved a challenge by the Attorney General of
New York to an acquisition in the breakfast cereal industry. Kraft, the
acquiring firm, was the third-largest seller of ready-to-eat cereals, with
about twelve percent of nationwide sales; most of its products were
sold under the Post brand.184 At the beginning of 1993, Kraft ac-
quired the breakfast cereal assets of the sixth-largest firm, Nabisco,
whose brand accounted for about three percent of the market.185 Two
other firms, Kellogg and General Mills had the largest national mar-
180 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
181 Any analysis of the competitive effects of the actual transaction also would need to
consider the potential loss of competition on individual city-pair routes served primarily by
the merging carriers, such as routes connecting their hubs, and whether the proposed di-
vestiture of routes and gates to a spinoff partially owned by American Airlines will be
sufficient to solve any competitive problems.
182 Another alternative that might have been relevant to the analysis of the actual
United/US Airways merger has been excluded by this assumption. The identity of the
airline industry maverick has changed over the years, as market conditions and business
fortunes vary. With some probability, absent the merger, either United or US Airways
could become the industry maverick in the future. This merger could have removed that
possibility, leading to higher prices than otherwise would occur, through the mechanism
discussed supra at Part III.A.1, or lower prices as discussed supra Part III.A.2.
183 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
184 Id. at 325.
185 Id. at 325-26.
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ket shares in the industry, approximately thirty-seven and twenty-five
percent, respectively.1 16
New York charged that the merger would harm competition in
two ways: facilitating coordination among the leading breakfast-ce-
real manufacturers, and giving the merged firm unilateral incentives
to raise prices for products of the two firms that were close substi-
tutes.18 7 Judge Kimba Wood rejected both theories, but only the coor-
dinated competitive effects allegations are of interest here. s88 in
support of that allegation, New York relied on the dinner party story
claim that "any time that you reduce the major sellers in a market
from six to five, you increase the likelihood of anticompetitive coordi-
nated conduct."'189 Judge Wood acknowledged that this view "reflects
economists' conventional wisdom" and that it was consistent with the
testimony of the court-appointed economic expert, Professor Alfred
Kahn.190
But Judge Wood did not stop her analysis with the dinner party
story. She pointed out the necessity of considering "whether the in-
crease in concentration that results from this Acquisition is, in fact,
likely to lessen competition." 191 Accordingly, she evaluated the plau-
sibility of the proposed mechanism by reviewing the "two scenarios
offered by the State as more competitive than the scenario produced
as a result of the Acquisition:' 92 forcing Nabisco to retain its break-
fast cereal assets with the hope that it would "decide both to resume
manufacturing [ready-to-eat] cereal and to be an industry 'maverick,"'
or allowing Nabisco to sell these assets to a new entrant who, the state
believes, would "find it in its interest to be more of an industry maver-
ick than Kraft."1 93
Judge Wood concluded, based substantially on the views of Pro-
fessor Kahn, that the transaction was not the acquisition of a firm that
constrains more effective coordination: "In the past, Nabisco was no
maverick. Instead, it followed the same competitive practices as its
larger competitors ... .,,194 The state did not allege, and Judge Wood
186 Id. at 335.
187 Id. at 363-66.
188 The two theories may be understood as alleged in the alternative.
189 Kraft Gen. Foods, 926 F. Supp. at 364. Based on the market share figures that Judge
Wood found the most probative, the acquisition would have raised the HHI by 66 points to
2281. Id. at 336.




194 Id. at 364-65. The court also concluded that enjoining a merger would not create a
maverick firm. Judge Wood found that neither Nabisco nor a new entrant would be likely
to compete differently from, or more effectively than, Kraft. Id.
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did not consider, anticompetitive scenarios predicated on the possibil-
ity that a merger among nonmaverick firms would harm competition
by excluding a maverick or inducing the maverick to prefer higher
prices. Accordingly, and notwithstanding the increase in industry con-
centration, New York's challenge to the merger failed because the
state could not explain why the loss of the acquired firm, Nabisco,
would remove a constraint on coordination.
2. Merger Creates a Maverick
A merger involving firms that are not mavericks, such as United
and US Airways, could benefit competition by creating a new industry
maverick. In particular, it could confer such large efficiencies on the
merging parties as to lead them to prefer a much lower price than
either did before the transaction, one below the price desired by
Northwest, the current industry maverick. 195 This possibility is recog-
nized by the Merger Guidelines. 1
96
The district court's decision in Federal Trade Commission v. H.J.
Heinz Co.,197 a case growing out of the FTC's challenge to Heinz's
acquisition of another baby food producer, Beech-Nut, suggests how a
merger can undermine the possibility of coordination by creating a
maverick. Although the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the district
court's conclusion that the record evidence was sufficient to prove
that possibility, and ordered the district court to enter a preliminary
injunction barring the merger, the appeals court recognized that on a
different record, an efficiencies defense to the government's coordi-
nated competitive effects could prevail. 198 Accordingly, the district
court's analysis is instructive as to the kind of facts that, if successfully
demonstrated in another case, would tend to show that a merger could
benefit competition by creating an industry maverick.
The basic facts about market structure were, for the most part,
not in dispute. The district court found that the relevant market,
jarred baby food in the United States, was highly concentrated. 199
195 If the possibility that this merger would generate a maverick seems far-fetched, con-
sider instead a hypothetical combination of three largely regional hub-and-spoke carriers-
TWA, America West, and Alaska-to create a more national carrier.
196 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 3, § 4 (revised 1997) ("In a coordinated interac-
tion context..., marginal cost reductions may make coordination less likely or effective by
enhancing the incentive of a maverick to lower price or by creating a new maverick firm.").
197 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2000), rev'd, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The author
testified as an expert economic witness on behalf of Heinz in this proceeding.
198 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 720-22.
199 Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 195. Defendants argued that retail competition should be
evaluated in local geographic markets, which were often more concentrated than the na-
tional averages, and the FTC's economic expert also accepted localized markets for analyz-
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Gerber had a market share of at least 65%, Heinz accounted for
17.4%, and Beech-Nut's share was 15.4%.200 Thus, the merger would
raise the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) by more than 500 points
to a level in excess of 5000; this would represent a substantial increase
in concentration in an already concentrated market,20 1 reducing the
number of significant sellers from three to two. The district court also
quickly concluded that entry was not easy.
202
"Nearly all" supermarkets carry two of the three major brands of
baby food.203 Gerber, the dominant firm, is in virtually every super-
market, while Heinz and Beech-Nut compete to be the second brand
on supermarket shelves. Heinz is carried in about forty percent of
grocery stores, while Beech-Nut is found in about forty-five
percent 20 4
The FTC's primary competitive effects theory was that the trans-
action would facilitate tacit collusion.205 The Commission alleged that
Heinz and Beech-Nut could not collude successfully with Gerber pre-
merger because the two second brands would have too great an incen-
tive to cheat through more aggressive shelf-space competition.20 6 If
Heinz went along with a high price, for example, Beech-Nut would
approach supermarkets with a sweet offer to replace Heinz on the
shelf, presumably expecting to profit by taking business away from
Gerber through a lower retail price. After the merger, however, there
would be only two significant firms in the market, and the wholesale
competition between Heinz and Beech-Nut, which the FTC saw as the
key impediment to tacit collusion, would be removed.20
7
ing retail competition. Record at 212-21, Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d. 190 (D.D.C. 2000)
[hereinafter Heinz Transcript].
200 Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 192. In this discussion, each firm is referred to by its
familiar brand name rather than the name of its corporate parent.
201 Id. at 196.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 193.
204 Id. at 193-94. Moreover, Heinz and Beech-Nut each had geographic areas of
strength (metropolitan areas where each was the second brand in most supermarkets while
the other brand had little presence). Id. at 194.
205 The FTC also alleged a unilateral competitive effects theory, and argued on appeal
that the loss of wholesale competition between the merging firms should be an indepen-
dent basis for finding a violation. The appeals court rejected this argument, while ac-
cepting that the merger's effects on wholesale competition "are important to a
determination of whether the merger is likely to reduce competition in the baby food mar-
ket overall." Heinz, 246 F.3d at 719 n.17.
206 Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 196-97.
207 Id.
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Heinz claimed, in contrast, that the merger would destabilize the
possibility of postmerger coordination by creating a maverick.208 The
district court explained that "[d]efendants argue that their merged
baby food business will be much more efficient, and that the efficien-
cies will be used to compete with Gerber. °20 9 Substantial efficiencies
would be obtained in the production of current products. Heinz and
Beech-Nut also contended that "with the best of the two brands' reci-
pes, Heinz's value pricing strategy, and Beech-Nut's brand equity,
they will have a more attractive and attractively priced product.
210
Moreover, the transaction would give combined firm shelf space in
most supermarkets, enabling "serious efforts to innovate."
21'
The district court rejected the FTC's argument that further con-
centration in the baby food industry would increase the likelihood of
tacit collusion, based on trial testimony that emphasized two coordi-
nation problems: the difficulty of deterring cheating, given the time it
would take for rivals to detect and respond to price cutting, and the
difficulty the merged firm would have in reaching a consensus with
Gerber given the combined firm's incentive to disrupt coordination by
expanding share at Gerber's expense.212 The court held that the de-
208 Heinz's economic expert testified that "the merged firm... would disrupt coordina-
tion, make it more difficult for the firms to coordinate." Heinz Transcript, supra note 199,
at 1013.
209 Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 198. Heinz's efficiency expert testified that the manufac-
turing cost savings from shifting the Beech-Nut production to Heinz's modern, low-cost
plant were "extraordinary" and "among the largest I have ever seen .... " Id. at 199.
Heinz could handle the combined production in its plant "and still have 20 percent capacity
available for future growth." Id.
210 Id. at 198. Unlike Beech-Nut and Gerber, which had premium brands, the Heinz
brand was a value brand, which buyers purchased mainly because of its low price (on aver-
age roughly 15% below that of Gerber and Beech-Nut). Heinz indicated that it would sell
the premium Beech-Nut brand at the Heinz value price, thus reducing average price by up
to 15% for Beech-Nut customers, reducing the quality-adjusted price by up to 15% for
Heinz customers, and giving Gerber customers the option of switching to another premium
brand at up to a 15% lower price. See Heinz Transcript, supra note 199, at 1005-06. De-
fendants' economic expert testified that the merged firm would be expected to pass
through at least 50% and quite possibly all of the efficiencies from merger to consumers,
id. at 997-1000, and that a 100% pass-through rate would be the equivalent of a 15% price
reduction to consumers (or equivalent benefit in terms of quality improvement). Id. at
1005.
211 Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
212 Id. at 198 n.7. Heinz's economic expert explained that Gerber likely exercised mar-
ket power in the premerger setting, not by colluding tacitly with Beech-Nut and Heinz but
because of its dominance of a market in which its two smaller rivals were unable easily to
expand. Heinz Transcript, supra note 199, at 985-89. The district court viewed Beech-Nut
and Heinz as competing for supermarket shelf space, but not as significantly competing at
retail, based in part on an empirical analysis introduced by defendants' expert showing no
difference in the price of baby food between cities in which all three firms had a significant
presence and cities in which only two did. Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 196.
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fendants had rebutted the FTC's prima facie case, based on market
concentration, "with proof that the proposed merger will in fact in-
crease competition," and that "the Commission responded to the re-
buttal case essentially with only structural theory.' 2 13 The district
court also accepted Heinz's contention that the efficiencies from
merger would promote competition in the market, crediting evidence
"about the efficiencies realized by the merger, and about the en-
hanced prospects of the merged entity to introduce innovative prod-
ucts to compete with Gerber. '2 14 Accordingly, the court found it
"more probable than not" that the merger "will actually increase com-
petition in jarred baby food in the United States. '2 15
The D.C. Circuit disagreed, and remanded the case with an order
that a preliminary injunction be entered.2 16 With respect to the effi-
ciencies, the appeals court held that the lower court's analysis fell
"short of the findings necessary for a successful efficiencies defense in
the circumstances of this case. '2 17 According to the D.C. Circuit, the
district court failed to consider the reduction in total variable costs
(rather than merely the variable costs of manufacturing), failed to an-
alyze cost reductions over the merged firm's combined output, and did
not explain satisfactorily why the merger partners could not obtain the
efficiencies through means short of merger.218 Moreover, the appeals
court rejected the district court's conclusion that postmerger collusion
was unlikely on the ground that defendants had failed to show that the
difficulties of overcoming "cartel problems," including the difficulty
an incumbent firm would face in reaching a consensus as to a coordi-
nated price and market shares with a maverick, "are so much greater
in the baby food industry than in other industries that they rebut the
normal presumption" of anticompetitive effect that would apply in re-
viewing a "merger to duopoly."2 19
213 Id. at 200.
214 Id. at 198. According to the district court, the efficiencies "will enable Heinz to pro-
vide the best of the two companies' recipes ... and to apply its value pricing strategy to the
combined production volume." Id. at 199. The resulting consumer benefits will be "imme-
diate and virtually automatic." Id. When these efficiencies are combined with the "new
platform for product innovation" that results from giving Heinz shelf space in most super-
markets, "it appears more likely than not that Gerber's own predictions of more intense
competition... will come true." Id.
215 Id. at 200.
216 FTC v. Hi. Heinz, 246 F.3d 708, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
217 Id. at 721.
218 In reaching these conclusions, the appeals panel appears to have overlooked trial
testimony indicating that Beech-Nut's total variable costs would fall by fifteen percent as a
result of the merger and predicting significant benefits to consumers. See supra note 210.
219 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 724-25. The appellate panel relied in part on evidence of past
price leadership to support its view that postmerger coordination was likely, id. at 724 &
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3. Merger of Nonmavericks Affects the Maverick's Incentives
The United/US Airways merger also could have affected the in-
centives of the industry maverick, Northwest, even though Northwest
would not have been involved directly. This theory likely would be
difficult to prove, and the resulting price effects could go either way.
One possibility is that the maverick would act more competitively
than before, lowering price. For example, the combination may im-
prove the attractiveness of the combined firm's frequent flyer pro-
gram, and give the merged firm a dominant share in more airports
than before. This could make the demand curve facing Northwest
both lower and more elastic. If the change in demand would en-
courage the industry maverick to prefer a lower industry price than it
previously favored, the merger would be procompetitive, and cause
price to fall.2
20
Alternatively, a merger of nonmaverick carriers instead could
lead the industry maverick to act less competitively than before, rais-
ing price. For example, the combined United/US Airways may com-
pete head to head with Northwest in many more cities than either
merger partner did on its own. This could affect the severity of the
punishment the merged firm would be expected to inflict in the event
any rival, including Northwest, cheated on the coordinated outcome.
If the likelihood of tougher punishment were to increase, the price at
which the maverick, Northwest, is indifferent between cheating and
cooperating might rise, leading to a higher industry price post-
merger.221 Remarkably, the expansion of United's route network and
n.23, even though that evidence did not distinguish the panel's economic theory from the
dominant-firm model endorsed by Heinz's economic expert. See supra note 210.
The appeals court also rejected two other rebuttal arguments that had been accepted
by the district court. It found that the lower court had erred in concluding that Heinz and
Beech-Nut did not really compete against each other at retail, 246 F.3d at 718-19, and in
concluding that the merger would promote innovation. Id. at 722-23. In analyzing retail
competition, the appeals panel implicitly found clear error in the district court's reliance on
systematic empirical evidence, in the form of econometric studies of pricing and demand
introduced by defendants' expert, Heinz, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 196; Heinz Transcript, supra
note 199, at 952-85, 1117-22, notwithstanding that the FrC's witnesses presented no sys-
tematic empirical evidence, econometric or otherwise, concerning retail competition. The
"record evidence" cited by the appellate panel as "undermin[ing] the district court's factual
finding" on retail competition under the clearly erroneous standard, Heinz, 246 F.3d at
718, included anecdotal testimony that one trial observer concluded had been "effectively
challenged" as not based on the direct knowledge of the witness. David Marcus, Two and
Three, Sponsored by the FTC, Corp. Control Alert 11, Sept. 2000, at 13.
220 United and US Airways presumably would not, however, be willing to go forward
with a merger likely to lower price absent substantial efficiencies from the transaction.
221 If punishment instead would become less severe, the gains to cheating might in-
crease, causing the maverick to become more aggressive and the industry price to fall.
Punishment methods are discussed supra at notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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service offering in this example represents an efficiency to the merging
firms, but is also anticompetitive: It permits the firms to coordinate
more effectively, thus also enhancing their market power and leading
to higher prices.
4. Merger of Nonmavericks That Excludes the Maverick
Finally, a merger not involving the maverick could harm competi-
tion by excluding the maverick. With respect to the United/US Air-
ways merger, this possibility might have arisen through changing the
nature of the systemwide coordinated interaction among the firms.
At the beginning of 2001, for example, seven major airlines com-
peted systemwide. If any of these seven firms did not go along with a
price increase, the increase was withdrawn. Smaller carriers with hub-
and-spoke route networks may have chosen to follow, but if they did
not, the routes they served were carved out of the systemwide fare
increases implemented by the major airlines. It is possible that the
United/US Airways merger, together with American's just-completed
acquisition of TWA, could have changed this regularity. After these
two transactions, American and United both would have enhanced
their attractiveness to business travelers,222 and both likely would
have controlled more gates and airport takeoff and landing slots at
congested East Coast airports.22 3 Under such circumstances, it might
have become profitable for American and United to raise price to-
gether systemwide, even if the remaining large hub-and-spoke carri-
ers-Continental, Delta, and Northwest-chose not to go along.
Northwest, formerly the maverick, would be excluded from the sys-
temwide competition. It would become a less significant regional
player in the interaction among the leading carriers, much as America
West and Alaska are today. Coordination on systemwide fares would
no longer require the participation of the other large hub-and-spoke
222 They each might have increased the scope of their route networks, making their fre-
quent flyer programs more attractive and allowing more businesses to make corporation-
wide air travel deals with a single carrier. Each also might have become a dominant pres-
ence at more airports. As a result, American and United each would attract more custom-
ers for their flights, and their business passengers in particular would become less willing to
switch to other hub-and-spoke carriers, including such large carriers as Continental, Delta,
and Northwest. If demand were to shift away from Continental, Delta, and Northwest,
that could deny these rival carriers scope economies, further reducing their ability to com-
pete successfully on many routes with postmerger American and United.
223 See Hearing on American Airlines Acquisition of TWA Before Sen. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 107th Cong. 4-6 (2001) (statement of Michael E. Levine, Ad-
junct Professor, Harvard Law School and former Executive Vice President, Northwest Air-
lines, Inc.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review).
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carriers; it would become limited to American and United.224 Al-
though one of these firms would become the new industry maverick, it
likely would prefer to allow systemwide fare increases that were pre-
vented by the old maverick, Northwest.225 If so, these mergers among
firms that are not now mavericks would lead to a market structure in
which only two firms, American or United, would be significant play-
ers in the systemwide pricing interaction, and the new maverick, one
of those two, likely would raise industry prices above the level at
which Northwest keeps them today.
2 26
IV
EXCLUSION OF THE MAVERICK
The problem of determining the competitive effect of losing a
firm also arises when exclusion is alleged. Not every exclusion case
would be expected to raise this question. In monopolization settings,
for example, all rivals are excluded, and it is not hard to understand
why the one seller that remains can exercise market power unilater-
ally. But when the theory of the case is that a group of firms obtained
market power by excluding (or hobbling)22 7 one or more rivals, that
theory presumes that the removal of the excluded firms makes it eas-
ier for the remaining firms to exercise market power, perhaps through
coordination.
Recent airline industry events suggest a number of methods by
which the leading airlines may be able to exclude rivals to create or
protect market power. These possibilities include limitations on rival
access to airport facilities controlled by a dominant carrier;22 8 preda-
224 See id. at 6-8 (discussing predicted dominance of proposed "Big Two" airlines).
Under this theory, the merger effectively would exclude all but the two largest firms from
systemwide coordination; theory thus involves both exclusion and collusion, as with JTC
Petroleum, discussed infra at notes 244-56 and accompanying text.
225 Before the merger, American and United likely both would have preferred price
increases in excess of what Northwest had permitted.
226 The outcome could differ, however, if these mergers confer substantial efficiencies,
and in consequence give one of the merged firms-the new maverick in the interaction
between American and United-a strong incentive to cut prices relative to today.
227 Recall that in this Article, the terms "foreclosure" and "exclusion" are used in the
general sense of "raising rivals' costs" or reducing rivals' access to the market. Supra note
7.
228 See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 962 (E.D.
Va. 2001), vacated, 2002 WL 53920 (4th Cir. 2002) (enjoining restrictions on size of carry-
on baggage at hub airport for United that benefited United at expense of rival Continen-
tal); Entry and Competition, supra note 126, at 109-23 (discussing potential for competitive
problems from incumbent carrier control of takeoff and landing slots at crowded airports
and gates at hub airports).
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tory pricing to exclude aggressive rivals 229 and the limitations on rival
access to travel agents and computerized reservations systems. 230 If
such practices were used to exclude Northwest, the industry maver-
ick-whether alone or along with other carriers-they could lead the
maverick to prefer higher industry prices, and thus cause prices to rise.
Here the maverick concept would operate as a sword, helping identify
when the exclusion of a rival would lead to higher prices. Again, the
maverick concept can be a shield as well as a sword: Exclusionary
practices that do not alter the maverick's business situation or pricing
incentives may not harm competition, and may be understood better
as motivated by an opportunity to achieve efficiencies.
Building on this insight, this Part highlights why, as a matter of
economic theory, the loss of a firm through exclusion may have simi-
lar economic consequences to the loss of a firm through merger.
Here, again, the maverick concept plays a central role in evaluating
the competitive effects of a range of business practices.
A. Voluntary and Involuntary Cartels
From an economic perspective, the merger question (whether the
disappearance of a firm through acquisition by a rival makes tacit col-
lusion more likely or more effective) and the exclusion question
(whether the loss of a firm through exclusionary conduct by its rivals
permits the remaining sellers to achieve or maintain market power
through tacit collusion) raise similar issues. Both practices facilitate
tacit collusion by removing or changing the incentives facing a maver-
ick firm. When comparing the acquisition of a maverick with the ex-
clusion of a maverick, the key difference is in how the maverick is
induced to go along with its rivals: voluntarily in the case of a merger,
and involuntarily when it is foreclosed from access to key inputs or
customers.231
229 See Entry and Competition, supra note 126, at 171-77 (listing informal complaints to
DOT by new entrant airlines about unfair exclusionary practices, March 1993 to May
1999); see generally Bolton et al., supra note 153, at 2261-62 (discussing application of
theories of price predation to airlines). But cf. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp.
2d 1141, 1218-19 (D. Kan. 2001) (awarding American Airlines summary judgment against
predatory pricing and conduct claims).
230 See Entry and Competition, supra note 126, at 124-29 (discussing regulatory action
to prevent computer reservation system biases, and exclusionary concerns arising from
travel agent incentives); John R. Wilke, Twenty States Oppose Airlines' Proposal for Joint
Venture in Online Reservations, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 2001, at A10 (highlighting exclusionary
as well as collusive concerns with planned industrywide Internet airline reservation
system).
231 In theory, exclusionary conduct also can generate market power through a second
route, by "dampening competition" among firms that are not coordinating (much as a
merger among rivals can harm competition through unilateral as well as coordinated corn-
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Suppose, for example, that firms A and B would like to collude
with firm C, their only rival in a market protected from entry. But
they cannot do so because C is the industry maverick; it would in-
crease output were A and B to raise price, and prevent the industry
price from rising above the level C prefers. The acquisition of firm C
by firm A could remove this constraint. The merged AC firm presum-
ably would prefer a price higher than what the maverick, firm C, ac-
cepts on its own. If so, the merger would harm competition by
facilitating tacit collusion-a voluntary cartel-between the merged
firm and its remaining rival, firm B. However, a merger is not the
only way firm A could remove the constraining influence of the indus-
try maverick, firm C. If firm A (alone or in conjunction with firm B)
somehow could raise firm C's marginal costs or otherwise make it
more difficult for firm C to sell more, then C would be led to do what
it would not have done previously: reduce its output and go along
with a higher price. Firm A might be able to accomplish this end by
foreclosing C from access to low-cost sources of supply or distribution,
perhaps through exclusive contracts, or by making it more difficult for
firm C to attract customers, perhaps by denying firm C access to com-
plementary products. Under such circumstances, competition is
harmed because the maverick would be coerced to go along with what
could be termed an involuntary cartel.232
As in the merger setting, the concept of a maverick can operate in
exclusion cases as sword or shield. The foreclosure of a maverick
would be expected to lead to higher prices through enhanced coordi-
nation among its rivals. Any efficiencies from the transaction would
need to be very large to overcome this anticompetitive force and to
generate a price decline on balance. Here the maverick concept ex-
plains why the particular exclusionary conduct would be expected to
harm competition. But practices excluding nonmaverick firms would
not make coordination more likely or more effective (unless the harm
to those rivals changes the incentives facing the industry maverick).
petitive effects). For example, a most-favored-customer provision can constitute a commit-
ment to less aggressive action, dampening competition if rivals can be expected to respond
by becoming less aggressive as well. Baker, supra note 109, at 528-30. This Article will
focus on the involuntary cartel possibility, as the dampening competition theory "repre-
sents something of a frontier for antitrust enforcement." Id. at 530.
232 The involuntary cartel intuition emphasizes that mere foreclosure of some rivals (or,
more generally, raising rivals' costs) is not enough for exclusion to generate harm to com-
petition. It is necessary also to show that the remaining rivals could and would take advan-
tage by reducing output and raising price too, as by removing the constraint on
coordination previously posed by a maverick, and that, in consequence, the market price
would rise. For some examples of agency actions predicated on a raising rivals' costs the-
ory, see Jonathan B. Baker, Policy Watch: Developments in Antitrust Economics, 13 J.
Econ. Persp. 181, 187-88 (1999).
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The identification of the maverick firm here would help shield the ex-
cluding firms from liability.233
B. Mavericks and the Case Law on Exclusion
Antitrust law relies on a number of doctrinal categories to police
harmful exclusionary conduct, including rules concerning exclusive
dealing, tying, group boycotts, predatory pricing, vertical nonprice
agreements, and resale price maintenance. But the underlying eco-
nomic problem is often the same,234 and, in consequence, the doctrinal
rules in these categories may be converging on a common reasonable-
ness analysis.235
Under the influence of the Chicago School, modem courts tend
to approach exclusion cases with skepticism.236 One common judicial
strategy for throwing out an exclusion case is to conclude that the al-
leged exclusion was too small to harm a rival (given the limited scope
or duration of the foreclosure).2 7 It is rare to find a court analyzing
whether the structure of the market is conducive to coordination,238
even absent the excluded rival, or whether the loss of the particular
excluded firm would make coordination more likely or more
effective.Z39
233 This discussion again assumes away unilateral (dampening competition) theories of
how that conduct may harm competition, discussed supra at note 231.
234 Krattenmaker and Salop explain how exclusionary conduct raises similar economic
issues regardless of doctrinal categories. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 7, at 215-19.
Of course, raising rivals' costs is not the only explanation for these forms of business con-
duct, or even the only anticompetitive explanation. Other anticompetitive possibilities
may include, for example, dampening competition theories, supra note 231, or anticompe-
titive price discrimination.
235 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (vertical maximum price fix-
ing); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
297 (1985) (exclusionary group boycott); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 59 (1977) (vertical nonprice restraints); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986
F.2d 589, 595 (1st Cir. 1993) (exclusive dealing).
236 Cf. Baker, supra note 109, at 518 (describing contemporary antitrust law's "vertical
good, horizontal bad" maxim as "deceptively simple" characterization).
237 See, e.g., Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1162-65 (9th Cir. 1997)
(applying strategy to manufacturer's exclusive dealing arrangements with distributors);
U.S. Healthcare, 986 F.2d at 597 (applying strategy to HMO's exclusive dealing contracts
with physicians).
238 But see Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,238
(1993) (concluding that structure of cigarette market in 1980s would have made tacit coor-
dination unmanageable). This case is discussed infra at notes 257-79 and accompanying
text.
239 But see JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir.
1999) (Posner, C.J.) (noting that maverick firm threatened cartel). This case is discussed
infra at notes 244-56 and accompanying text.
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Exclusion often is challenged retrospectively, making it unneces-
sary for courts to analyze the mechanism by which exclusion of a rival
may facilitate coordination. Under such circumstances, direct evi-
dence of the exercise of market power may be available-for exam-
ple, price may have risen-so identification of the mechanism
facilitating coordination may not be a pressing question. But exclu-
sion also may be challenged before the effects have become clear in
the marketplace.2 40 Then the question of the mechanism by which
exclusion leads to improved coordination may become important to
the resolution of the case.241
The remainder of this Part highlights two cases that suggest how
the idea of a maverick can be relevant to the analysis of the likely
competitive effects of exclusionary conduct. In JTC Petroleum v.
Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc.,242 the Seventh Circuit undertook the kind of
analysis that, this Article argues, should be employed generally to an-
alyze coordinated competitive effects in exclusionary conduct cases.
In Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., a predatory
pricing case where oligopoly recoupment was alleged, the Supreme
Court found coordination was unlikely.243 Had the Court concluded
otherwise, as it probably should have done, given the record and the
procedural posture of the case, its analysis could have been sharpened
by focusing on identifying the industry maverick.
1. JTC Petroleum
The litigation that led to the Seventh Circuit's JTC Petroleum de-
cision began when JTC, a road-repair contractor and asphalt applica-
tor, complained in the district court about two alleged conspiracies. 244
JTC alleged two violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act: first, that
240 Merger analysis commonly has been prospective since premerger notification was
introduced in 1976, under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No.
94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390-94 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994)).
241 See, e.g., Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 243 (rejecting predatory pricing claim as matter
of law because evidence failed to demonstrate likelihood of oligopoly pricing); see also
FTC Staff, Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World of B2B Electronic
Marketplaces, Part 3, at 16 (Oct. 2000) (noting "little evidence of current exclusion" from
business to business electronic marketplaces, but issuing "warnings regarding the poten-
tial" of and expressing "widespread concern about possibilities" for such conduct).
242 190 F.3d at 775.
243 509 U.S. at 238, 243. Predatory pricing is not rational unless the predators have a
reasonable prospect of maintaining monopoly power (after the period of low prices ends)
for long enough to recoup the predator's losses from below-cost pricing and to harvest
some additional gains. Id. at 231-32. If the predator is not a monopolist, but is part of an
oligopoly, it must engage in tacit coordination with its rivals to assure recoupment. This
would be termed "oligopoly recoupment."
244 190 F.3d at 776-77.
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rival applicators had agreed not to compete with one another, and
second, that the three asphalt firms producing a key input for applica-
tor firms had agreed not to compete among each other as well.245 JTC
settled with the asphalt producers and three of the six applicator de-
fendants, but Piasa and two other applicators fought the case in court.
The district court awarded summary judgment to Piasa and the other
defendants.246 The appellate panel was asked to decide whether, on
evidence construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, JTC had
come up with an economic theory by which Piasa and the two other
non-settling applicator firms harmed both competition and JTC, thus
giving JTC standing to litigate the case.247
Writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, Chief Judge Richard
Posner said JTC had such a theory.248 Posner recognized that the ap-
plicators could achieve market power in two ways. First, they could
collude among themselves. This would require the cooperation of all
seven applicators, including JTC. JTC's theory, according to Posner,
was that Piasa and the other applicators wanted to reach such a collu-
sive agreement, but could not because JTC would not go along. JTC
preferred competition to collusion. To exercise market power, there-
fore, the applicators other than JTC were required to adopt a second
method: forcing JTC to reduce output and raise price. With JTC
compelled to go along, the remaining applicators could succeed in
raising price by colluding among themselves. According to this the-
ory, the applicators would exercise market power by creating an invol-
untary cartel to exclude the maverick.249
The appeals court panel posited that Piasa and the other collud-
ing applicator firms could force JTC to reduce output and raise price
by removing a maverick from the market to create an involuntary car-
tel. The other firms recognized, according to Judge Posner, that "TC,
a maverick, was a threat to the cartel-but only if it could find a
source of supply of emulsified asphalt."5 0 Accordingly, the remaining
applicators could remove that threat by organizing an asphalt-produc-
245 Id. at 777.
246 Id. at 776.
247 Id. at 778; cf. Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 597
(7th Cir. 1984) (finding that disruptive competitor is appropriate plaintiff to challenge its
expulsion from industry association because otherwise, association may "use expulsion as a
sanction against any member who refuses to abide by its anticompetitive restrictions").
248 JTC Petroleum, 190 F.3d at 778-79.
249 The appeals court likely understood these facts as describing a horizontal collusion
case (involving cartel policing). The involuntary cartel intuition emphasizes that they
equally can be interpreted as describing an exclusion case. Nothing of significance in the
economic analysis turns on the fact that JTC was competing with several colluding applica-
tor firms, rather than with an applicator monopolist.
250 JTC Petroleum, 190 F.3d at 778.
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ers boycott of JTC, thereby "deny[ing] JTC this essential in-
put .... ."251 They could enlist the asphalt producers' help in one of
two ways. Perhaps the applicators "coerc[ed]" the asphalt producers
"by threatening to buy less product from them or pay less for it,"
Posner suggested.25 2 Or, more likely, the applicators "may have been
paying the producers" to police the cartel.253 This is plausible because
cartel profits "create a fund out of which the cartel can compensate"
the asphalt producers "in the form of a higher price" for asphalt "for
their services to the cartel. ' 254 In short, "[t]he producer was the cat's
paw; the applicators were the cat. '255 Judge Posner summed up the
theory in colorful language: "[T]he reason for the producers' refusal
to deal with JTC was that they were in cahoots with the cartel to dis-
courage competition in the applicator market. ' '256
2. Brooke Group
Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. ,257 a 1993
Supreme Court predatory pricing decision, was a missed opportunity
to exploit the concept of a maverick in the analysis of exclusionary
conduct. The case grew out of a price war in generic cigarettes. In
1980, the original plaintiff, Liggett,258 created a new segment in the
cigarette market, low-priced generic products, and spearheaded its
growth. By 1984, the generic segment accounted for four percent of
domestic cigarette sales, Liggett was the largest producer of generics,
and the vast majority of Liggett's own sales were of generic ciga-
rettes.259 Rival Brown & Williamson had added generic cigarettes to
its product line, but, unlike Liggett, Brown & Williamson was also a
significant player in the branded segment of the cigarette market.260
The other major cigarette manufacturers, including Phillip Morris and
R.J. Reynolds, were primarily sellers of branded products, although
they too produced generics. (Brown & Williamson, though larger
than Liggett, accounted for no more than twelve percent of the ciga-






256 Id. at 779.
257 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
258 The Court consistently refers to the plaintiff as "Liggett," rather than Brooke Group
Ltd., to reflect Brooke Group's former corporate name. Id. at 212.
259 Id. at 212-15.
260 Id. at 214-15.
261 Id. at 213.
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teen-month generic price war, and the generic segment grew
dramatically.262
Liggett claimed that the generic price war resulted from preda-
tory pricing by Brown & Williamson.263 Price predation occurs when
a firm sets a low price, below an appropriate measure of its own costs,
in order to eliminate or reduce competition, and thereby gain or pre-
serve the ability to exercise market power.264 According to Liggett,
Brown & Williamson introduced its own line of generic cigarettes and
cut the price of generics dramatically in order to impose losses on Lig-
gett, thereby inducing Liggett to raise the price of generics above Lig-
gett's original price to a level closer to that of branded cigarettes.
Brown & Williamson would profit from this strategy, according to
Liggett, by avoiding the otherwise-inevitable loss of profits in the
branded segment of the market that would result from a persistent
large price gap between brandeds and generics. An increase in the
price of generics sufficient to preserve a supracompetitive price for
brandeds formed the "linchpin" of the alleged predatory scheme.265
For this to occur, Liggett would need to raise the price of generics, but
so, too, would the other firms through "tacit price coordination"
among the members of the cigarette oligopoly.
266
After trial in federal district court, a jury returned a verdict in
favor of Liggett and awarded damages. 267 The district court judge
overruled that verdict, holding that defendant Brown & Williamson
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.268 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed,269 and the Supreme Court also upheld the district court's
award of judgment as a matter of law.270 The Court concluded that
the record evidence, examined in the light most favorable to Liggett,
would not support the conclusion that the alleged predation had a rea-
sonable prospect of causing the price of generics to rise sufficiently to
262 Id. at 215-16, 231. As of 1989, the generic segment accounted for fifteen percent of
cigarette sales. Id. at 234.
263 Id. at 216-17. Although Liggett's complaint was brought under a provision of the
Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994), the Supreme Court
suggested that it would have analyzed the case similarly under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 221-22.
264 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-26.
265 Id. at 232.
266 Id. at 238.
267 Id. at 218.
268 Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344, 348
(M.D.N.C. 1990).
269 Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th
Cir. 1992).
270 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 219, 230.
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make the predation strategy profitable to the predator, Brown & Wil-
liamson, by allowing the predator to recoup the costs of predation.271
The Court reached this conclusion in part because it saw tacit col-
lusion as unlikely. It acknowledged that a reasonable jury could have
found that generic prices rose in fact, but did not accept that tacit
collusion among the cigarette oligopoly, including a successfully disci-
plined Liggett, was the cause.272 The Court argued, based on four as-
pects of market structure, that tacit collusion was unlikely in the
cigarette industry. First, it noted that "declining demand and... sub-
stantial excess capacity... tend to break down patterns of oligopoly
pricing and produce price competition." 273 Second, it argued that the
large "number of product types and pricing variables" in the industry
creates a complex and difficult coordination task.274 Third, it pointed
out that firms with differing incentives might have difficulty reaching
an oligopolistic consensus.275 Finally, it observed that uncertainty
could make such a consensus unstable, capable of falling apart in "a
chain reaction of competitive responses. ' 276 In short, the Court con-
cluded that the structure of the cigarette industry was not conducive
to solving the cartel problems of reaching a consensus and deterring
deviation; these problems facing the cigarette oligopoly were intracta-
ble. Accordingly, the Court did not need to go further by analyzing
how coordination would work and identifying the maverick.
Each of these arguments can be questioned based on the contem-
porary economic understanding of coordination.277 Briefly, excess ca-
pacity could facilitate coordination by increasing the ability of the
271 Id. at 232.
272 Id. at 237. In its alternative holding, the Court found that the evidence did not nec-
essarily show that the alleged predation caused the generic price increase. In particular, it
could not rule out the possibility that the price rose in a competitive market through the
demand for generics shifting out along a rising marginal cost curve. Id. This conclusion is
surprising given that the cigarette market was not growing (suggesting that market demand
had not shifted out, notwithstanding that many buyers were shifting between segments,
from brandeds to generics) and that the leading firms had excess capacity (suggesting that
the industry marginal cost curve was not rising). Because generics and brandeds are likely
supply substitutes, the relevant capacity measure is for cigarettes as a whole. Hence, a shift
in tastes to favor generics, the Court's proposal, would be unlikely to lead to an increase in
the price of cigarettes in either segment. Baker, supra note 153, at 599 & n.68.
273 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 238.
274 Id. at 239.
275 Id. at 239-40.
276 Id. at 240.
277 See Baker, supra note 153, at 600-02 ("The majority's discussion of ... industry
structure was not informed by post-Chicago developments in oligopoly theory.. . ."); FFC
Staff, Competition and the Financial Impact of the Proposed Tobacco Industry Settlement
3-9 (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter Impact of the Tobacco Settlement] (citing "structural and be-
havioral evidence ... consistent with the possibility of coordination among the major ciga-
rette producers," while noting that "any such coordination is far from complete").
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 77:135
MAVERICKS, MERGERS, AND EXCLUSION
firms to punish cheating rivals; the firms could have employed focal
rules to simplify what the Court termed their "multivariable coordina-
tion" problem;278 divergent incentives may make coordination imper-
fect and incomplete without necessarily making it impossible; and
occasional price wars are not inconsistent with the possibility of coor-
dination. Had the Court seen the industry environment as not barring
successful coordination given the insights of recent economic theory,
it would have recognized that Liggett was the likely constraint on
more effective coordination, and that the cigarette oligopoly intended




REHABILITATING THE STRUCTURAL PRESUMPTION
As this Article has demonstrated, the concept of a maverick may
permit antitrust enforcers and courts to distinguish between mergers
or exclusionary conduct that improve coordination and mergers or ex-
clusionary conduct that do not. Doing so may provide a more compel-
ling basis for antitrust enforcement than the traditional reliance upon
the presumption of anticompetitive effect from changes in market
structure.
In many settings, regulators reliably can identify an industry mav-
erick that prevents or limits coordination. Northwest likely has been
the maverick with respect to recent systemwide airline competition,280
Liggett likely played that role in the cigarette industry during the
1980s,28 1 and JTC Petroleum likely was the maverick asphalt applica-
tor mi its market.282 Mavericks can be identified by revealed prefer-
278 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 239; see also supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
279 Baker, supra note 153, at 601 n.76.
Liggett's incentives to deviate from a coordinated outcome came from its relatively
small allegiance to the branded segment of the market and its relatively large commitment
to the generic segment. The divergence of interest among the remaining major cigarette
producers was likely small, although R.J. Reynolds, with its economy-priced Doral brand,
may have been the firm most likely to have constrained coordination in the absence of
Liggett. Id. Similarly, more than a decade after the alleged predation that was the subject
of Brooke Group, a FTC staff report concluded, "Liggett remains the only firm of signifi-
cant size that has an appreciably older brand portfolio in terms of premium-brand life
cycles and a primary commitment to the discount segments of the cigarette market. This
likely makes Liggett one of the most significant constraints on higher industry pricing to-
day." Impact of the Tobacco Settlement, supra note 277, at 13. (The author was Director
of the FTC's Bureau of Economics when this report was issued.)
280 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
281 See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
282 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. Judge Posner also may have identified a
maverick in the truck-leasing market. See Gen. Leaseways, Inc., v. Nat'l Truck Leasing
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ence, through observation of natural experiments, or based upon a
priori factors.28 3 Against this background, one might ask whether an-
titrust law could discard the structural presumption as a relic of an
earlier era with little contemporary relevance.
The best response is that, even as antitrust comes to focus on the
role of the maverick in analyzing coordinated competitive effects, the
structural presumption should continue to play an important role, be-
cause it will not always be possible to identify the maverick with preci-
sion or to determine with confidence how the loss of a firm affects the
maverick's incentives. For example, the difference between the dis-
trict court and appellate court in Heinz can be understood as a dispute
about whether the record in that case permitted identification of a
postmerger maverick with reasonable precision. The district court
concluded that the merger would create a firm willing and able to
compete more aggressively with Gerber, rather than collude with the
market leader, and refused to enjoin it. The appeals court found that
the lower court should not have relied upon the efficiencies evidence
that led the lower court effectively to identify the merged firm as a
maverick, and was left with no option but to rely upon a presumption
of anticompetitive effect from the increase in market concentration.
284
As this decision suggests, when the maverick and its role cannot be
identified, the structural presumption will remain the best available
basis for enforcement policy.
Moreover, the structural presumption now can be justified by
more than the weak empirical regularity embodied in the dinner party
story. The role of the maverick in the modern economic perspective
on incomplete oligopoly coordination provides a theoretical connec-
tion between market concentration and more effective coordination:
In the absence of specific evidence identifying a maverick, the fewer
the number of significant sellers, the more likely it is that the loss of
any one would be the loss of a firm that constrains coordinated con-
duct.285 This point can be demonstrated through a simple calculation.
In the absence of other information about the relative positions of the
firms or the motive for acquisition, a merger combining at random
Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) ("If the [National Truck Leasing] Asso-
ciation is a cartel, still General Leaseways appears determined to disrupt it.").
283 See supra Part II.D.
284 See supra notes 70-77, 197-219 and accompanying text.
M Cf. Porter, supra note 113, at 18 ("When firms are numerous, the likelihood of mav-
ericks is great and some firms may habitually believe they can make moves without being
noticed."). Moreover, if the differences among firms are randomly drawn, a reduction in
the number of firms likely would make greater the differences between the maverick and
the firm that would next assume the maverick role, and thus increase the likely price rise if
the maverick disappears from the market.
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two firms in a three-firm market has a two-thirds probability of involv-
ing a maverick, most likely creating a new seller with less incentive to
keep industry prices low. In contrast, a merger combining at random
two firms in a ten-firm market has only a twenty-percent probability
of involving a maverick.286 Accordingly, judicial reliance on the struc-
tural presumption when the maverick and its role cannot be identified
reliably is consistent with the modem economic analysis of
coordination.
The tradeoff at stake in preserving the structural presumption is a
familiar one for antitrust law. The maverick-centered approach ad-
vanced in this Article promises to allow courts and antitrust enforcers
more effectively to distinguish changes in market structure that im-
prove industry coordination from those that do not. This advantage is
grounded in the value of increasing the precision of judicial determi-
nations, by reducing the likelihood of error costs from erroneous con-
victions or false acquittals. Concern with error costs historically has
pushed antitrust doctrine away from bright-line rules and toward un-
structured reasonableness standards.287 Thus, the structural presump-
tion has weakened substantially since the days of Von's and Pabst, and
properly So. 288
But minimizing error costs is not the only important policy con-
sideration relevant to the formulation of doctrinal rules. Other policy
concerns-minimizing enforcement costs and providing clear gui-
dance for generalist judges who must enforce those rules-have his-
torically pushed antitrust doctrine toward "bright-line" rules, such as
per se rules and truncated or "quick-look" analyses. 28 9 These latter
286 Within firms, the probability is 2/n; thus a random merger in an industry with five
significant firms (HHI at least 2000) has a forty percent chance of involving a maverick.
The random exclusion of a firm in an n-firm industry (as opposed to an acquisition, which
changes the structure of two firms) has half that probability, 1/n, of excluding a maverick.
However, if mergers or exclusionary conduct have a higher-than-random chance of involv-
ing mavericks, because the gains from acquiring or excluding a maverick may include en-
hanced market power, then these probabilities understate the relevant odds.
287 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1979)
(declining to apply per se prohibition against price-fixing to "blanket-license fee" structure
for copyrighted material, remanding for consideration under rule of reason standard);
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,57-58 (1977) (overruling per se prohibi-
tion against exclusive distribution territories to avoid deterring efficiency-enhancing
restraints).
288 See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898)
(noting that courts adopting reasonableness analysis have "set sail on a sea of doubt" by
assuming power to say "how much restraint of competition is in the public interest"), aff'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). For discussions of the relevant tradeoffs from an economic perspec-
tive, see generally Jonathan B. Baker, Per Se Rules in the Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal
Restraints, 36 Antitrust Bull. 733 (1991); C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop,
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concerns provided an important underpinning for the development of
the structural presumption in Philadelphia National Bank.290 They
continue to weigh in favor of retaining a structural presumption, in the
weaker form the presumption now takes,291 but only in limited cir-
cumstances: when it is difficult to identify the maverick or determine
the effects of merger or exclusion on the maverick's preferences.292
Accordingly, the continuing vitality of the structural presumption
turns on its role as a fallback from a more precise identification of the
maverick and the effect of the merger on the maverick's incentives to
constrain coordination. Under this approach, the structural presump-
tion, in its weakened modem form, remains appropriate for courts
and enforcers to rely upon, but only when it is not possible to provide
a more compelling explanation of the mechanism by which competi-
tion would be harmed. This nuanced and limited defense of the struc-
tural presumption harmonizes antitrust doctrine with contemporary
economic analysis.
Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 Antitrust L.J. 41 (1999); Timothy J. Muris, The
Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of Reason: In Defense of Massachusetts Board,
66 Antitrust L.J. 773 (1998). Although most of the discussion of truncated rules has fo-
cused on section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), similar issues may also arise
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). See generally Jonathan B.
Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 Geo. Mason
L. Rev. 495 (1999).
290 The Court explained:
[A] prediction [that a merger will harm competition] is sound only if it is based
upon a firm understanding of the structure of the relevant market; yet the rele-
vant economic data are both complex and elusive. And unless businessmen
can assess the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound
business planning is retarded. So also, we must be alert to the danger of sub-
verting congressional intent by permitting a too-broad economic investigation.
And so in any case in which it is possible, without doing violence to the con-
gressional objective embodied in § 7, to simplify the test of illegality, the courts
ought to do so in the interest of sound and practical judicial administration.
United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (citations omitted).
291 See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
292 Moreover, the error costs of basing merger enforcement decisions on a structural
presumption can be reduced if an empirical relationship between market structure and
higher prices can be demonstrated for the specific industry under review. See Muris, supra
note 20, at 903-07 (reviewing use of modern oligopoly theory and industry-specific inquiry
in merger analysis); see generally FTC Bureau of Economics Staff Report, Transformation
and Continuity: The U.S. Carbonated Soft Drink Bottling Industry and Antitrust Policy
Since 1980 (Nov. 1999) (providing empirical study of relationship between concentration
and price in soft drink bottling industry). For discussion of an example of the use of an
industry-specific empirical study in merger litigation, albeit not with respect to analyzing a
coordinated competitive effects theory, see Baker, supra note 88, at 13-17.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix provides a numerical example to clarify how a
maverick constrains coordination when coordination is incomplete. In
the example, the firms in the market other than the maverick would
do best if the industry price were 10. But the maverick is able to insist
that the industry charge a lower price, 9, which the maverick prefers.
Either coordinated price, 10 or 9, would exceed the price absent coor-
dination, 5.
The single-period payoffs facing the maverick are set forth in Ta-
ble 1. The best price for the maverick, assuming its rivals match, is 9;
at that price, the maverick earns a single period profit of 150. The
maverick can do much better in any period if it cheats (profit of 1000)
while its rivals price at a high level. But cheating will make coordina-
tion break down; if that were to occur, the maverick's single period
profit would drop drastically, to only 10. 293
TABLE 1
Maverick's
Description Price single-period profit
Coordinated price favored by rivals 10 100
Coordinated price favored by maverick 9 150
Price maverick sets if it cheats on a 8 1000
coordinated price
Industry price if coordination breaks down 5 10
The example assumes that the products of the firms are suffi-
ciently similar, and the maverick has sufficient ability to expand (ca-
pacity), as to make it unprofitable for the other firms to charge a high
price if they are undercut by the maverick. The maverick is effectively
too important to carve out of a coordinated arrangement. 294 But the
example also assumes that the products of the firms are sufficiently
differentiated or consumer search costs are sufficiently high as to lead
the maverick, in recognition of the structure of demand and costs, to
prefer to undercut the coordinated price substantially rather than by a
293 Ten might represent firm profits if the firms compete in each period without taking
into account the possibility that their interactions are repeated.
294 Cf. Rotemberg & Saloner, supra note 132, at 94 (arguing that price matching
emerges endogenously in model in which firms sell differentiated products). Nothing in
the example would change if some firms charged different prices to compensate for differ-
ences in perceived product quality, so long as those price differentials were fixed. Moreo-
ver, even if rivals were not forced to match the maverick's price, cheating by the maverick
would still be expected to lower the profits to the others from continued coordination,
pulling rivals' prices down.
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tiny amount. The single period profit assumptions in Table 1 are thus
compatible with some product or geographic differentiation. The
maverick's preference for a coordinated price lower than that pre-
ferred by its rivals could derive, for example, from more elastic firm-
specific demand than that faced by the others.295
In deciding what strategy to follow-whether to cooperate or
cheat-the firm evaluates the present value of the future stream of
profits that results. Future profits are discounted at an annual rate of
ten percent; this can be thought of as the firm's cost of capital or its
hurdle rate on new investments.2 96 To make the calculations simple,
cheating is assumed to last for a full year before detection and re-
sponse; with this assumption, the "period" of the model is interpreted
as one year.297 If the firm selects the coordinated price, then coordi-
nation lasts forever. If the firm instead decides to cheat, coordination
breaks down in the next period and is never achieved again.
To see why the maverick insists upon a price of 9, consider first its
incentives to cheat if the firms set the higher price that the others
prefer, 10. The maverick computes the present value of its profit
stream that follows from cheating. (Table 2 sets forth the present
value of the various payoff alternatives.) If the maverick cheats, it
sets the price at 8 and earns 1000 in the first period, but coordination
breaks down so it earns only 10 in every period that follows. The pre-
sent value of this profit stream equals 1090.298 The maverick com-
pares this payoff to the present value of going along with the
coordinated price of 10, and earning 100 annually forever. The latter
profit stream has a present value of 1000, which is less than the pre-
sent value of the profit stream with cheating. Cheating is more profit-
able than cooperating because the punishment available to the other
firms in the example is limited to the breakdown of coordination, and
295 Structural factors tending to lead firms to prefer a lower coordinated price than do
its rivals are discussed supra at notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
296 Some firms decide whether to pursue proposed investment projects by testing their
expected profitability against a minimum required rate of return, termed a "hurdle rate."
297 This time period is unrealistically long for the airline industry, but is more plausible
for industries in which firms sign long-term contracts with customers. A similar example
could be constructed for shorter periods by varying the discount rate and the payoffs. For
example, the analysis would be similar under the assumption that a period lasts a month
and the monthly discount rate is one percent, if the single-period payoff column of Table 1
is replaced by the following numbers: [10, 15, 1000, 1]. In this revised example, the maver-
ick will still prefer to cheat at a price of 10-as the present value of cheating (1099) will
exceed the present value of cooperation (1000)-but will cooperate at a price of 9, as then
the present value of cooperation (1500) exceeds the present value of cheating (1099).
298 The present value of a profit stream of X every year forever at an annual discount
rate of ten percent is 1OX. If the profit stream starts after one year's delay, its present
value is X less, or 9X in total.
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because the other firms cannot raise the maverick's single-period
profit at the price of 10 through side payments.
On the other hand, the maverick would not find cheating profita-
ble if the coordinated price were 9, the level it prefers. At that price,
assuming that the single period profits from cheating remain 1000,299
the present value of cheating remains 1090. But that payoff is less
than the present value of cooperation, which is now 1500.
TABLE 2
Present value of profit Present value of profit
Price set by rivals stream from cooperation stream from cheating
10 1000 1090
9 1500 1090
If Table 1 were expanded to allow the maverick to earn single-
period profits of 110 at a coordinated price of $9.10, the maverick also
would prefer coordination to cheating at $9.10. Then, coordination at
$9.10 would also be an equilibrium outcome 00 But the maverick
does even better by insisting on a coordinated price of $9, so that is
the price it will select. It can insist on a price of $9 because its rivals
will lose too many sales by remaining at the $9.10 price without the
maverick going along.
299 The example would not change markedly if the maverick's preferred cheating price
varied with the cooperative price set by its rivals, so long as the single period payoff from
cheating remains similar to 1000. Cf. Steven L. Puller, Pricing and Firm Conduct in Cali-
fornia's Deregulated Electricity Market 18-20 (Jan. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the New York University Law Review) (providing model in which cheating firm's out-
put decisions vary with cooperative output level).
300 Thus, the example may permit multiple coordinated equilibria.
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